

Doing "Being Friends" in Japanese Telephone Conversations

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His current research is concerned with the study of interaction in regular prenatal checkups, focusing on the social organization of vision and touch. His recent publications include "The embodied organization of a real-time fetus: The visible and the invisible in prenatal ultrasound examinations" (*Social Studies of Science* 41(3): 309-336, 2011), "Touch without vision: Referential practice in a non-technological environment" (*Journal of Pragmatics* 43: 504-520, 2011) and "Self-initiated problem presentation in prenatal checkups: Its placement and construction" (*Research on Language and Social Interaction* 43(3): 283-313, 2010), among others. He also has been conducting research on interaction between evacuees and volunteers in the areas directly affected by the earthquake on March 11, 2011 and the subsequent nuclear power plant explosion.

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Abstract:

By extending George Psathas' program for exploring the interrelationship between membership categorizations and sequential organizations of interaction, I demonstrate how "being friends" is accomplished in and through the actual development of interaction. I analyze several segments from tape-recorded Japanese telephone conversations, all of which occur between college students who attend the same school. The focus is on the ways in which a particular relationship type (i.e., friend-friend), rather than the relevance of a membership categorization device as such, is interactionally and contingently embodied in the actual course of interaction through the activation and implementation of normative expectations bound to the relationship type, under particular constraints imposed by generic expectations as to the organization of telephone calls. The relationship between the parties to a conversation is negotiable in interaction, as well as provides a resource for the organization of interaction.

Keywords: Membership categorization devices, Sequential organizations, Ordinary interaction, Relationship types, Telephone calls.

1. Introduction: Relationship in interaction and interaction in relationship [297]

In one of his papers (Psathas, 1999), George Psathas explores a way of combining two resources for the technical analysis of talk-in-interaction: sequential organizations of interaction (such as the organization of turn-taking, the organization of action sequencing, etc.) and the organization of identities of the parties to the interaction, or "membership categorization devices" (Sacks, 1972a, 1972b). In particular, he focuses on the interrelationship between the organization of "work" and "categorizations". He remarks about those conversation analytic studies which propose to bring back Harvey Sacks' earlier concern with membership categorization, as follows:

[B]y understanding how "categorization work" is ongoing, we can also understand how organizational context is invoked and made relevant by the parties since organizational identities are involved. And, since, in their talk-in-interaction, they are engaged in "work", such studies may reveal how the work of the organization is ongoingly produced in and through their interaction. (Psathas, 1999: 142)

In what follows, I attempt to extend this program in one direction. The interrelationship between social identities of the parties to an interaction and the organization of their interaction is embodied not only in "organizational contexts" but also in more ordinary ones. In more ordinary contexts, such as a telephone conversation between parties who take the same class in college, one does, or does not, approach the other by reference to their supposed relationship, which is to be "categorized" by reference to a ordered set of category-pairs, such as wife-husband, parent-child, friend-friend, acquaintance-acquaintance, |stranger-stranger, etc., that is, [298] the membership categorization device that Sacks (1972a) calls "R". Indeed, one of the decisive criteria for the "ordinariness" of interaction may rather be whether the interaction is established by reference to R or any other categorization device; the

reference to R may be expected to be incorporated into the reason for the initiation of ordinary interaction, as is the case with a telephone call made because they (the caller and the called) are "friends". When one calls a delivery company to inquire about the current status of one's parcel, the call is not made by reference to R (i.e., because they are "strangers" to each other), but by reference to another membership categorization device, which includes "service representative" and "customer" as its members.²

Thus, the relevance of a membership categorization device, i.e., R, and the ordinariness of ordinary interaction may be intimately interrelated.

Given the relevance of R, however, the identity issue, that is, the issue of who the caller and the called are as approaching, and being approached, still remains. All ordinary conversations between two parties are embedded in the relationship between them, whether parent and child, friend and friend, acquaintance and acquaintance, or the like. How the current conversation has developed and will develop depends on the parties' relationship with each other. On the other hand, their relationship is constructed, reconstructed and maintained through each conversation, or interaction, whether unmediated or mediated; without any interaction, no relationship exists. The actual course that a conversation takes is certainly shaped by the relationship between the parties in which the conversation is embedded, but the relationship is also enhanced or even destroyed by a conversation.

In what follows, through the analysis of tape-recorded Japanese telephone conversations, I explore several practices which the parties employ for being friends (i.e., being friends, as opposed to other relationships in R) in conversation, and demonstrate how they maintain, renew, and even negotiate their relationship 'being friends' in and through the actual development of interaction. In this way, I elucidate the locally produced order in which the natural accountability of the relationship

"being friends" is interactionally accomplished (see Garfinkel, 1967, 2002; Garfinkel & Wieder, 1992). The data were collected in Japan in 1996 and 2000; all the calls were made between home telephones (land lines), not cell phones.

2. Negotiation of relationship

As Emanuel A. Schegloff elucidates in his series of articles on the opening sequence in ordinary telephone conversation (Schegloff, 1968, 1970, 1979, 1986, 2002a, 2002b), the caller and the called have to recognize each other early in conversation. The following is a simple case. (All the extracts cited in this article are composed of three tiers: At each numbered line, there is first a romanized original Japanese transcript.³ Below this is a phrase-by-phrase gloss. Finally, a rough English translation is added as the third tier.) After the called answered | the phone in line 1, [299] the caller identifies herself by her first name (*mikiko*). She is calling someone who takes the same class in college.

(1) [MI 8]

- | | | |
|---|---------|---|
| 1 | Called: | <i>moshi moshi: ɸ:?</i>
hello
"Hello?" |
| 2 | Caller: | └ <i>moshi moshi: ɸ: mikiko desu kedo:.</i>
hello PN JD though
"Hello, ((it)) is Mikiko." |
| 3 | Called: | └ <i>n::n.</i>
"Yeah." |
| 4 | Called: | <i>hai ha: ɸi.</i>
yes yes
"Yes, yes." |
| 5 | Caller: | └ <i>hh ano sa::: ɸ::.</i>
uh P
"Uhm," |
| 6 | Called: | └ <i>hai.</i>
"Yes." |

- 7 Caller: *toransup- kuriputo tte >honto< san juu byoo de ii no:?*
 transp- cript P actually thirty second P good P
 "As for transcription, thirty seconds will be fine really?"

Note that in Japan, the default (unmarked) way of identifying oneself is using one's surname; using one's first name, as here, rather than one's surname, carries an implied assertion about a degree of intimacy in terms of the membership categorization device R, consisting of an ordered set of pair relationships which is applicable to categorize *any* two members of a society. If one chooses any two people, these have to be in one, and only one, of the ordered pair relationships, such as "wife-husband", "parent-child", "brother/sister-brother/sister", "friend-friend", "acquaintance-acquaintance", and "stranger-stranger". These category-pairs are normatively ordered by degree of intimacy. Probably, we have a cultural mapping rule between the order of identification forms and the order of relational categories; in Japan, it seems to me that the "FIRST NAME *desu* (It is FIRST NAME)" format is only normatively usable for those category-pairs "friend-friend" and higher level pairs (such as "wife-husband") in the order of relational category-pairs. Thus, the identification form that the caller uses in line 2 is specifically designed for someone who is supposed to be a friend (insofar as this person cannot be categorized as a wife or a child in relation to the caller).

Furthermore, the design of the caller's identification ("((it)) is Mikiko.") embodies at least two claims: that the caller has recognized the recipient, the called, from her (the recipient's) response to the ring in line 1, and that the recipient *should* recognize the caller from this very identification form (*plus* voice sample). In line 4, the called emphatically (that is, with the double *yes*'s) claims to have recognized the caller, and then (line 5), without receiving an | identification from the called's side, the caller [300] moves on to present the reason for the call. In this way, in the course of the

interactional accomplishment of the recognition of each other's identity, the fact of being friends to each other is presupposed, utilized, ascertained, maintained and reestablished.

In the following segment (Extract 2), the same caller uses a very different identification form, her surname (lines 2 and 6), to identify herself to a different person.

(2) [MI 5]

- 1 Called: *hai (mo)shi mo::shi,*
yes hello
"Yes, hello."
- 2 Caller: *.h ha moshi moshi seiji gakuin daigaku no iketani to*
yes hello PN PN university P PN P
- 3 *mooshi masu ga:*
called-PL JD-PL P
"Yes, hello, my name is Iketani, from Seiji Gakuin University."
- 4 Called: *ha ri::,*
"Yes,"
- 5 Caller: *└.hh ano tetsugaku no kyookasho no koto:::- o*
uh philosophy P textbook P thing P
- 6 *kashi te iru ike ri-tani-*
lend has PN
"Uh, ((this is)) Iketani, who has lent you the textbook for philosophy-"
- 7 Called: *└a, aa ri-aa aa┐, ri-mikiko?*
oh oh oh oh PN
"Oh, yeah, Mikiko?"
- 8 Caller: *└a :: n┐ └.h*
"Yeah"
- 9 Caller: *UN mi ri-kiko desu kedo┐*
yeah PN JD P
"Yeah, ((it)) is Mikiko."
- 10 Called: *└ aa aa aa ┐ n ri*
oh oh oh yeah
"Oh, yeah."
- 11 Caller: *└.hh*

12 *ano:::-- ano ne, kyuu ni ne, tetsugaku...*
 uhm uhm P suddenly P philosophy
 "Well, well, ((I need the textbook for))
 philosophy ((returned)) as soon as possible..."

Not only does the caller use the default (unmarked) form for self-identification, that is, the surname *Iketani*, but also the construction of her self-identification in lines 3-4 embodies a different set of claims than the previous case. First, she claims here that the recipient, the called, may *not* recognize the caller by the | name (*plus* voice [301] sample) being provided, this claim being carried by the (polite) form "*NN to mooshi masu* (my name is NN)"⁴ *plus* naming of her affiliation. Second, no claim is made to have recognized the recipient from the latter's response ("*hai (mo)shi mo::shi*, [Yes, hello.])" to the phone-ring (whereas the caller does not claim *not* to have recognized the recipient, either). In this context, the recipient cannot claim her recognition of the caller just by saying "*hai* (yes)" (line 4), which can be no more than an acknowledgement of the caller's self-identification. Indeed, the caller initiates the second, additional attempt to identify herself in lines 5-6, in which she mentions the particular relation between the caller and the called (i.e., the fact that the called currently has the caller's philosophy textbook). The caller's reattempt to identify herself, thus, appears to facilitate the recognition by the called. Note that the construction of this second attempt embodies the caller's claim that she *had* already recognized the called at the moment of lines 2-3, though she did not claim the recognition then.

In lines 2 through 6 of Extract 2, the caller pursues the mutual recognition based on a default (unmarked) identification form, that is, the surname. If this is the case, the incipient encounter that the caller has initiated is claimed (by the caller) to be

between those who are expected to be mutually recognizable by the surname, that is, "acquaintances" rather than "friends".

Now, what strikes me is the way in which the called responds in line 7. By uttering multiple *aa's* (*oh's*), the called emphatically claims to have recognized the caller *now*. Furthermore, the called *demonstrates* her recognition of the caller by uttering the caller's first name, material which was not contained in the caller's self-identifications⁵. In doing so, the called not only demonstrates her recognition but also claims that their relationship should be the one in which the parties are expected to call each other by their first names, that they should be more than acquaintances — friends! Indeed, it seems to me that into the change of reference forms (from the surname to the first name), the called incorporates an account of her failure to recognize the caller immediately after the caller's first self-identification in lines 2-3. Through the upward intonation with which the first name is pronounced, the called provides a candidate understanding of who is calling to be confirmed by the caller, implying that the first name is more understandable in terms of their relationship and that the use of the surname (*plus* the format carrying the claim that she may not be recognized ["my name is"] *plus* the affiliation ["from Seiji Gakuin University"] *plus* a polite form) misled her into an incorrect inference about their relationship, resulting in recognition failure.

In response, the caller confirms in line 9 that she is Mikiko, not merely by saying "yes", but by re-doing self-identification using exactly the form provided by the called; in doing so, the caller also ratifies the called's claim about the appropriateness of using the first name for their relationship, and then moves on to present the reason for the call in line 12.

Now, we begin to see that the relationship between caller and called is not predetermined prior to the call, providing a "mold" which would constrain the course of interaction in a telephone call. The relationship is subject to | the moment-to- [302] moment negotiation in and through the actual development of interaction.

3. A call beyond the reason

Negotiation of relationship can be done all through an encounter. We saw an instance at the very beginning (or even at a pre-beginning) of an encounter (Extract 2). We now turn to a *possible* end of an encounter. The following (Extract 3) is excerpted from one of a series of calls between those who attend the same college. The caller has made the call to ask the called to change the place for meeting together in the near future. The segment starts when they are coming to an agreement on where and what time they are going to meet.

(3) [TB 06:36-07:09]

- 1 Caller: *ano hen ni:, (.hh) juu ni ji?*
that around twelve o'clock
"At twelve around there?"
- 2 *(0.4)*
- 3 Called: *un.*
"Yeah."
- 4 Caller: *jaa (ano hen) juu ni ji de.*
then that around twelve o'clock JD
"Then, at twelve around there."
- 5 Called: *'ai.*
"Yes."
- 6 Caller: *okkee?*
"OK?"
- 7 Called: *okkee.=*
"OK."
- 8 Caller: *=maa soo yuu koto desu.*
well that like thing JD
"Well that is it."

- 9 (.)
- 10 Called: *hai*
"Yes"
- 11 Caller: *n::n. maa son' dake.*
yeah well that only
"Yeh, this is all."
- 12 Called: *n::n.*
"Yeh."
- 13 Caller: *'ai jaa soo yuu koto de.*
yes then that like thing JD
"Yes, then bye now."

| The place and the time for the meeting are agreed upon in lines 1 and 3. Then, the [303] caller introduces the utterance in line 4 with the token *jaa (then)*, which marks what to follow specifically as a conclusion from what precedes it. This utterance, taking the form "*jaa ... ↓de (then, ((it should)) be ...)*", appears to constitute a finalizing request for confirmation, requesting confirmation what they should do *next together* after the call is terminated. The acceptance of this request (line 5) leads to a "closing section" (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973). In line 13, after a series of three sequences, to which I will return later, the caller makes a finalizing request for confirmation that they should terminate the call, with the "*jaa ... ↓de*" form, again (the request now finalizing the entire call by referring to this with the demonstrative expression *soo yuu koto [thing like that]*). This request provides a sequential slot for its acceptance or rejection immediately following it. If the called said "*jaa (then)*", "*hai (yes)*", and the like, this could be the very last word of the call, and they could hang up the phone. However, the following is the continuation of Extract 3.

(4) [TB 07:09-07:15; the continuation of (3)]

- 13 Caller: *'ai jaa soo yuu koto de.*
yes then that like thing JD
"Yes, then bye now."

- 14 Called: *a:: moo ki 'cchau no? =*
 well so-soon hang-up P
 "Are you going to hang up now?"
- 15 Caller: *=ehehehhh n:: iya(h) .hh ehehe*
 yeah no
- 16 *haa:. ee. nanka arimasu ka.*
 yeah yes anything there-is IR
 "Well, is there anything else?"
- 17 Called: *a iya:: na ʔnka ko-ʔ a:no:: mae ano =*
 oh no anything uh before uh
- 18 Caller: *ʔ .hhhhh ʔ*
- 19 Called: *= keejiban ni(hh) ʔ.h hhʔ nanka nokke te =*
 board P something post being
- 20 Caller: *ʔn::n ʔ*
 "Uh huh"
- 21 Called: *= ta mitai ʔ(de shoo)*
 PAST like JD IF
 "Oh, no, it seems like ((you)) posted something
 up on the board before, right?" [Lines 17, 19, and 21]
- 22 Caller: *ʔa:: nokketa.*
 oh posted
 "Oh, ((I)) posted."

Indeed, the called does not accept the caller's request for confirmation that they should terminate the call. Note that the construction of the called's rejection in line 14 has a strong moral implication. It is formatted as a question, which asks | what the [304] recipient, the caller, is currently doing that is obvious at this moment; the caller has obviously moved to the termination of the call. If a teacher asks a student who is obviously going out of the classroom whether he or she is going out, if a teacher asks students who are chatting during a class whether they know that it is still during a class, and the like, these questions, whose answers are so obvious that the teacher cannot be considered to seek for these very answers, constitute a distinct action of complaint or even criticism. The called's question in line 14, whose answer is also obvious, has a similar force, constituting a complaint about the caller's move to the

termination of the call. What is wrong about the caller's behavior? What is the organizational ground for the complaint?

Here is one possibility: The caller's behavior is morally deficient in terms of their supposed relationship, being friends. Sacks (1972a) observed that the membership categorization device R can be divided into two subsets: R_p and R_i , that is, relational category-pairs which one can *properly* or *improperly* draw on to search for help, respectively. If you have some trouble, you can properly seek help from those who can be in the relation "wife-husband", "parent-child", "friend-friend", and, probably, "acquaintance-acquaintance" with you, only because they are your wife, parent, friend or the like, but not from those who are "strangers" to you only because they are strangers. This is one of the possible divisions of R into R_p and R_i ; there are possibly other divisions. For example, who is properly supposed to make a phone call without a *particular* reason for the call, only to talk? One of the tests for being in a relationship "friend-friend" (more precisely "good friend-good friend"⁶) or a higher level one (such as "parent-child") may be whether you can make such a phone call. Certainly, as Schegloff & Sacks (1973) observes, the default (unmarked) number of the reasons for a call is one; if you have more than one reason, you would say at the beginning of the call "I have two things to talk about" or the like, but you would never say, if you have one reason, "I have only one thing to talk about". If you do not have any reason for the call, you would say "I do not have any reason, but I just wanted to talk to you" or the like, but you would never say, if you have a reason for the call, "I have a reason for this call", without implying that you have a very special reason. However, my mother always accuses me of calling her only when I have a particular reason. It seems to me that there is a very clear division rule, setting a line somewhere between "friend-friend" and "acquaintance-acquaintance": You are

morally obligated to call without any particular reason those with whom you stand in the relationship "friend-friend" or a higher level relationship, whereas you are prohibited from calling without any particular reason those with whom you stand in the relationship "acquaintance-acquaintance" or a lower level relationship.

The caller in Extracts 3 and 4 has contacted the called with a very specific reason. If the caller terminates the call immediately after the reason has been properly addressed, their relationship may be reconfigured such that it is precisely one for which calling each other only for a particular reason is properly expected. Given that the caller and the called are friends to each other, such behavior constitutes a complainable.

| In this respect, the caller's behavior in lines 6 through 11 (Extract 3) is quite [305] interesting. Immediately following the acceptance of his request for confirmation on the place and time for meeting (line 5), he could have initiated the termination of the call, but did not; he requested another confirmation ("OK?" line 6) and announces twice (lines 8 and 10) that his reason for the call has been properly addressed and that nothing else to be discussed remains. In doing so, the caller appears to provide the called with opportunities to raise any new topic, if the latter wishes. Thus, it appears that the caller also orients to the normative expectation⁷ that he should not terminate the call immediately following the completion of the business for which the call was made. In other words, the caller who calls for a particular reason is also sensitive to the expectation that their conversation should survive the completion of the very business of the call. The called's complaint in line 14 (Extract 4), moral-implicative behavior, then appears to be built on this observable orientation of the caller's; the called appears to rely on the caller's orientation to that expectation as a moral ground for his moral-implicative behavior. Thus, it seems that both the caller and the called

orient to the normative expectation that friends should continue their conversation without any particular reason other than that they are friends to each other.

On the other hand, both the caller and the called in Extracts 3 and 4 exhibit as well a strong orientation to the generic expectation that a phone call should be made and continued for a particular reason; it is not the case that the normative expectation about friendship simply overrides the generic (also normative) expectation about phone calls. In response to the called's complaint, the caller produces a counter-question ("is there anything else?") in line 16. This question appears to be about whether any other business remains to be addressed in this current call, not just any topic. Indeed, the question even appears to request the called to provide a legitimization for his complaint in terms of possible businesses to be addressed.⁸ Moreover, in response to this question, the called first appears to deny that he has such legitimization, by saying "*a iya::* (oh, no)" (line 17). Thus, throughout Extracts 3 and 4 both the caller and the called manage to do "being friends" within the constraint imposed by the generic expectation of particular businesses for a phone call.

The legitimization that the called provides for his complaint is not what is hearable as another business, but the talk he initiates in line 17 is constructed as very "other-attentive" (Jefferson, 1984b); in the talk ("it seems like ((you)) posted something up on the board, right?"), the called demonstrates that he has an adequate interest in the caller. First, the called demonstrates that he noticed what the caller had done (posting on the board) and still remembers it. Second, though, as the expression *mae* (*before*) indicates, it is a substantially long time ago that he noticed the posting, it is not just another posting which he happened to notice. Note the caller's response in line 22, "*a:: nokketa*. (Oh, ((I)) posted.)", which exhibits the caller's recognition of which posting of his the called refers to. From this exchange, we can learn that the

posting that the called mentions is the possibly newest one that the caller made, and that the called knows this very fact. In other words, the called exhibits such attentiveness to the caller that he has possibly tracked the caller's behavior on the board and knows the caller has | possibly not posted since that posting. The called's [306] claim is now understandable in the following way: Even though he does not have a particular business to be addressed in this current call, he is morally entitled to talk in the way that exhibits the degree of interests in the caller which is adequate to their supposed relationship. However, soon the called initiates a "self-attentive" topical talk, to which we turn now.

4. Mentionable trouble

The following (Extract 5) is the segment of interaction which occurs seven lines later than Extract 4. They are talking about postings on the same board (though I do not know what they refer to as "voting", which can be assumed to be related to the board). In line 5, the called abruptly introduces a new, "self-attentive" topic; he reports a trouble which he had on that day.

(5) [TB: 07:27-07:37]

- 1 Caller: *maa demo sudoo- ima made toohyoo*
well but PN now till voting
- 2 *shita koto nai desho betsuni.*
have-not-done JD-IF particularly
"Well, Sudo, ((you)) have never voted, have you?"
- 3 Called: *maa ne::.*
well P
"Something like that."
- 4 Caller: *maa sono u ʔn. h-*
well uh yeah
- 5 Called: *↳soo oira jitsu wa kyoo wa kaze hii te*
right I actually today P cold catch

the trouble, then the friend, in reference to the ordered relational category-pairs, may think that he or she should relay it to your parent or spouse; then, your parent and spouse may accuse you of not telling such an important thing to them first.⁹

(Precisely because of this, Sacks argued, if there is any special reason why you cannot tell the trouble to the person in the relationship of the highest priority, even though that person is available, you cannot tell the trouble to anyone in reference to the membership category device R.) How about less serious, but still serious, troubles? (Note that the called uses the expression *kutabaru* [*almost die*] to emphasize the troublesomeness in an extreme way; it was not just another cold, though it was still no more than a cold.)

It seems to me that there is a normative expectation with a dividing rule working on these (less serious) troubles, which is that one should tell this kind of trouble to those with whom one stands in the relationship "friend-friend" or a higher level relationship, at the first opportunity to tell it to them after one had it (as long as it can be news). One does not have to first tell it to someone in the relationship of the highest priority, but, for example, if your friend does not tell it to you at the first opportunity and you happen to hear it through a third party, you may wonder why he or she (your friend) has not told it to you though there was an opportunity for him or her to tell it to you directly; your relationship with him or her may be reconfigured such that you were not friends after all. (One should note that under these circumstances, it makes perfect sense for you to say to those who have relayed the news to you, "Why didn't s/he tell it to me, though we talked on that day?"; that is, the fact that your friend did not tell the trouble to you is "remarkable". It is hard to imagine that one, who happens to learn, through a third party, what one's friend had for breakfast on the day when they talked, would make the same kind of remark:

"Why didn't s/he tell...?" See also Sacks' notes on the normative expectation that one spouse tell news to the other on the first occasion when they can [Sacks, 1992, vol. 2, pp. 339-440].) | Indeed, I suspect that the called in Extract 5 actually wanted to tell [308] this trouble to the caller when he resisted the termination of the call in Extract 4, but now we see that there is a systematic motivation for the called to seize any chance to bring up the topic of that trouble he was having on that day, given that this current call is the earliest possible opportunity for him to tell it to this caller.

One may notice another difficulty involved with bringing up the topic of not very, but still serious trouble. While really serious trouble can be the *official* reason for a phone call to a friend, it seems that trouble of such a degree as having had a bad cold cannot be. (It seems difficult to imagine calling someone, even a friend, by saying "I am calling to inform you that I almost died today from a cold.") The telling of this kind of trouble may need to be fitted into the course of interaction, whether in the course of a phone call made without a particular business or whether after the completion of the official business for which the call has been made. This latter is exactly what happens in Extracts 3, 4 and 5.

In this respect, the continuation of Extract 5 may be interesting. After expressing sympathy (line 12), the caller asks the called whether he has taken medicine (line 14).

(6) [TB: 07:37-08:08: the continuation of (5)]

12 Caller: *sorya yoku nai ne.*
 that's good not P
 "That's too bad."

13 Called: *desh ɾoo.*
 "It is, isn't?"

14 Caller: ^L.*hh (0.8) kusuri wa nonda kai?*
 medicine P take IR
 "Did you take medicine?"

- 15 Called: *uun:, nonde nai kedo moo tabun daijobu,*
no take NG but now probably all-right
"No, I didn't, but I think I'm all right now."
- 16 Caller: *iya, demo kaze gusuri nonde hito ban neru 'tte*
no but cold medicine take one night sleep P
- 17 *no ga ore ni toccha ichiban ii na::* ¶:
P P I P for most good P
"Well, but it's the best for me to take a cold remedy
and sleep all night."
- 18 Called: *└un.: 'teyuka*
yeah I-mean
- 19 *kinoo- m- mechakucha atama itakute* ¶ne:,
yesterday terribly head hurt P
"Yeah. I mean I had a terrible headache yesterday,"
- 20 Caller: *└hontoo.*
"Really."
- 21 Called: *yaba::::: toka omotte tara kyoo hontoni dame*
very-bad P think as today really bad
- |22 *da* ¶tta. [309]
JD-PAST
"((I)) was thinking that ((it)) might become horrible, and
today ((I)) was really sick."
- 23 Caller: *└hoo:::n.*
"Uh huh."

The most interesting aspect here is the way in which the called responds to the caller's question about taking medicine in line 15. He not only says, "No, I didn't.", but adds to it a remark which does not seem to address the question itself, that is, "but I think I'm all right now". We can see from this response how the called understands the caller's question; the question is taken as a question such that if the answer to it is negative, advice to take medicine is due to follow.¹⁰ In line 15, after answering the question, then the called preempts the advice which is now seen to be due, and rejects this (projected) advice. Indeed, in response to this rejection, in lines 16-17 the caller appears to further pursue his preempted advice by mentioning what is the best for *him* to do when he catches a cold. Then, in lines 18-19, to rectify the caller's misled

supposition now observable from his response, the called initiates the clarification of what he meant when he introduced the "cold" topic, marking the utterance as such with the token *teyuuka* (*I mean*); he mentions that the symptoms began on the previous day, implying that it is now the final stage of the cold, and that it is totally irrelevant to take medicine at this stage. By retelling the trouble in clarifying the intention (what *he meant*) of the original report, the called makes it clear that he did not introduce the topic to obtain advice as to how to deal with the trouble. Its introduction was intended just as it, that is, just to tell the caller the trouble.¹¹

In the previous section and this one, we have seen that being friends is an interactional accomplishment which the parties need to manage to achieve through the activation and implementation of possible normative expectations bound to the relationship type "friend-friend", under various interactional contingent constraints (such as constraints imposed by generic normative expectations about phone calls). Being friends is far from a pre-given stable feature of the relationship between some two people.

5. Conclusion

Conversation analysis has demonstrated varied organizations for talk-in-interaction (Sacks et al., 1974; Schegloff, 2007a; Schegloff et al., 1977, among others). These organizations operate over any parties whose relationships among each other vary, but precisely because of this feature, each conversation needs to be organized in ways which are sensitive to all the particularities of each particular conversational situation. The relationship between the parties to the conversation is one of these particularities. All the organizations for conversation need to be finely tuned into normative expectations that are bound to relationship types, i.e., expectations as to how one [310]

should behave in relation to another with whom one stands in the relationship type. In this essay, I have examined how some of the organizations for conversation, and in particular, some aspects of the organizations for the opening and closing and the topical organization, operate to implement normative expectations bound to the membership categorization device that Sacks (1972a) called "R".

Most "ordinary" conversations appear to be sought for in reference to R; they are initiated by the parties because they are wife and husband, parent and child, friend and friend, acquaintance and acquaintance, for example, with or without a particular official reason. However, even if the relevance of a particular membership categorization device appears to be established from the outset of the encounter, the issue of which relationship type between the parties to the encounter (whether "friend-friend" or "acquaintance-acquaintance", for example) is embodied in and through the actual development of interaction still remains. This issue is not only an analytical one for the analyst, but one to be addressed by the parties themselves. They need to resolve this identity issue in optimized ways in confrontation with various conversational organizations which are concurrently operative. To continue to be friends, they need to survive this interactional practical problem of optimally meeting multiple organizational requisites.

If the called in Extracts 3-6 had not been successful in introducing the topical talk on the cold he had had since the previous day, and the caller had heard the news through a third party, what would have happened to them? Probably, nothing would. What if this misfortune had been the second one immediately following another one? To be friends, certainly, is a simple fact, but this fact is not so simply provided.

Notes

¹ An earlier, Italian language version of this article will be published in *Quaderni di Teoria Sociale* (a special issue in Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis), XI, 2011, translated by Enrico Caniglia.

² Some radio interviews are set up in reference to the membership categorization device "Japanese and non-Japanese" (see Nishizaka, 1995, 1999).

³ In the first tier, a transcription system developed by Gail Jefferson is used (see Jefferson, 2004, for the most recent version). Several of the notational conventions are as follows: left and right broken brackets ([and]) bridging two lines indicate points of overlap onset and ending, respectively; a dash (-) indicates a cut-off of the preceding word or sound; colons (:) indicate stretching of the preceding sound; and numbers and a dot in parentheses indicate silence in tenths of a second and less than 0.2 second, respectively. In the phrase-by-phrase gloss, the following abbreviations are used: IF for 'inferential'; IR for 'interrogative'; JD for 'judgmental'; P for 'particle'; and PL for 'polite'; PN for 'proper name'. All the proper names in the extracts have been anonymized.

⁴ See Sacks & Schegloff's, 1979, discussion on the difference between "recognitional" and "nonrecognitional" reference forms, that is, between reference forms from | which the recipient of them is supposed to recognize the referred-to and reference forms from which the recipient is not supposed to do so. Names are usually the most typical instance of "recognitionals". See also Schegloff, 2007b, for his discussion on person reference in opening sequences of telephone conversations.

⁵ See Sacks, 1992, for the difference between claiming and demonstrating: "Things like, e.g., at the end of some first story a recipient says 'I know just what you mean.'

Period. We can say that that's a *claimed* understanding as compared to having some way to produce some materials that *exhibit* an understanding" (vol. 2: 252, emphasis in original).

⁶ Sacks (1972a) observes that the category "friend" is internally ordered: "its incumbents with respect to each other stand in an orderly relation relevant to their alternatively being approached" (Sacks, 1972a, p. 61).

⁷ By "normative expectations", I mean those expectations that are essentially counter-factual, that is, essentially protected against the factual features of any particular person, any particular relationship, any particular conversation, etc. For example, if a particular parent does not take care of his or her child, the normative expectation that a parent should take care of his or her child is not defeated. See also Note 9.

⁸ The caller's question in line 16 is preceded by many hesitations: laughter, the denial token *iya*, and other particles such as *n*, *ee*, and *haa*. These are features of "dispreferred" responses (Pomerantz, 1984) and "trouble resistance" (Jefferson, 1984a). These features may be a display of their producer's understanding that what he was going to do (i.e., requesting legitimatization for the continuation of the phone call) was also possibly unfavorable and complainable.

⁹ Whenever I mention this to my students, they speak up, saying that they put higher priority on the relationship "friend and friend" than "parent and child" as to whom they tell their trouble first, in particular to seek help. Note, however, that if their parent learns about their really serious trouble through their friend, the parent, only because of being their parent, is generally expected, or even entitled, to say to them, "Why didn't you tell such a thing to me first?", while if their friend learns it through their parent, it is hard to imagine that the friend makes the same remark to them. The

normative expectation works regardless of the factual features of the actual relationship between particular people.

¹⁰ In the conversation analytic literature, this type of question is called a "pre-sequence". See Sacks, 1992; Schegloff, 1980, 2007; Terasaki, 2004, among others.

¹¹ Jefferson & Lee (1981) observes that in ordinary conversation, advice given after a trouble talk tends to be rejected by the teller of the trouble. This observation appears to be related, in one way or another, to what occurs in the extracts I have reproduced.

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