

Title: Partitioning a Population in Agreement and Disagreement

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Partitioning a Population in Agreement and Disagreement

Abstract

This study demonstrates that participants partition the population including themselves and their referents, in order to manage the distributions of entitlements to speak of particular subjects and perform particular actions. They may disagree with or even contest the partitioning implicated in each utterance. Drawing on Harvey Sacks's idea of membership categorization devices, an analytic framework is provided in which what has been discussed under the rubric of epistemics and deontics is rearranged. The data are the video-recordings of monthly meetings held by a group of residents from a town issued a Fukushima-related evacuation order in 2011 that was finally lifted in 2014. They are in Japanese and presented with English translation.

Keywords: Membership categorization, Conversation analysis, Partitioning of a population, Knowledge, Responsibility, Benefit, Fukushima disaster

1. Introduction

Scholars have pointed out that participants orient to the distribution of various kinds of rights, epistemic or deontic, in the formation and sequencing of action in interaction (Heritage, 2012a, 2012b, 2013; Heritage & Raymond, 2005; Raymond & Heritage, 2006, for epistemic rights; Stevanovic & Peräkylä, 2012, 2014, for deontic rights).¹ Many (if not all) of these distributions appear connected to identities with which they participate in the current activity. For example, a person relevantly categorized as “Japanese” may be more entitled to talk about the Japanese language and ways of life than a “non-Japanese” (Nishizaka, 1995). One of my concerns is the complexity of the very notion of knowledge. *Conceptually*, it may make no sense to say about “Japanese” that they *know* the Japanese language, insofar as their speaking Japanese is part of their “form of life” (see Wittgenstein, 1953, 1969). Similarly, do I know my marital status better than one who views the official document of my marital status? As Wittgenstein (1953, § 246) suggested, I may not even know my marital status insofar as I do not doubt it. My marital status is part of my life rather than an object of my knowledge. The issue is not who *knows* my marital status better, I myself or the official who views the document. In the activity of checking my legal marital status, the official responsible is in a good position to tell it to me, while in the context of a party conversation, I, whose marital status is at issue, am the most entitled to talk about it. Some resources that have been subsumed under the epistemic dimension (such as part of life vs. expertise) are, in fact, incommensurable, and, as Heritage (2012a, p. 5) has noted, they may even be in conflict.

To address the complexity of issues surrounding knowledge and other related notions, I develop Sacks's idea of "membership categorization devices" (Sacks, 1972a, 1972b, 1992), focusing on how speakers in interactions propose to "partition a population" (see Sacks 1992); that is, speakers propose assigning certain identities to themselves, the recipients, and those referred to in the utterances. This has been elaborated through the analysis of various materials, whether spoken in naturally occurring settings or written in news media (see Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998; Housley & Fitzgerald, 2015; Hester & Eglin, 1997, for an overview). Some have demonstrated how the use of membership categories in describing an action or event simultaneously provides an account for this action or event (Eglin & Hester, 2003; Stokoe, 2012; Whitehead & Lerner, 2009); in other words, an account or explanation is embedded in category selection. Other studies have demonstrated that certain identity types are "turn-generated" in the sequential organization of interaction (Psathas, 1999; Watson, 1997). All of these studies focus on what participants *do* with the reference to certain categories.

One may be reminded that in his explication of membership categorization as a mechanism that generates "possible actions" (rather than "possible descriptions," Sacks 1972b), Sacks (1972a, 1992) analyzed utterances in which *no* membership categories appear, such as "no one to turn to" and "We were in an automobile discussion" (see also Schegloff, 2006). In one of his lectures (Sacks, 1992, vol. 1, pp. 300–305), Sacks addressed the machinery that generates the intelligibility of a particular utterance ("We were in an automobile discussion") as a possible invitation. The utterance mentions a distinct activity ("automobile discussion") that is bound to the membership category "male teenager," as

male teenagers are (or were) *generally* (or stereotypically) expected to show an interest in automobiles. Insofar as the utterance is addressed to one male teenager by another, it brings their co-membership to the fore, thereby possibly inviting the addressee to join what they are reported to have been doing. Here, membership categories are mobilized to categorize the speaker, the addressee, and other recipients—namely, to partition a population (see also Reynolds, 2017).

Similarly, Sacks (1972a) analyzed the utterance “no one to turn to,” recurrently observed in interactions between callers to a suicide prevention center and its staff. The specific membership categorization devices “R” (i.e., the collection of pair-relationship categories) and “K” (i.e., the “expert–lay” pair) were explicated as parts of the machinery that generates the intelligibility of the utterance as a possible “search for help”; “no one” refers to the categorial domain of persons to whom the caller could turn by virtue of the pair-relationships, such as a spouse or parent, thereby denying the availability of R for a search for help and invoking the availability of K to continue the search. Here, too, membership categories were mobilized to categorize the phone caller and the staff simultaneously as “stranger–stranger” and “expert–lay”—namely, to partition a population in reference to relationship and knowledgeability.

The distributions of the rights of speaking about or doing things, connected to the partitioning of a population, do not cover everything that has been discussed under the rubric of epistemic and deontic rights and responsibilities. However, in examining them, I address an issue that may previously have been missed: How are different domains of knowledge and responsibilities, which may be incommensurable with each other, managed in reaching

an agreement? To answer this question, expanding Raymond and Heritage's (2006) discussion on "territories of ownership and accountability that are partly constitutive of how identities are sustained *as identities*" (p. 700), I examine how the consistency of partitioning based on multiple identity collections is negotiated in complex manners (whether categories are explicitly mentioned or not).

After briefly describing the data and method, I first examine two cases of reaching an agreement from the different sides of the partition (Section 3); I illustrate the very idea of the *consistency* of the partitioning of a population. Then, I explore how the participants reach a mutual agreement via the negotiation of partitioning (Sections 4 and 5); I examine cases in which participants address disagreement regarding the partitioning of a population while being in agreement regarding each proposal, statement or the like that is advanced. Subsequently, I examine a case in which local residents explicitly confront visitors from the national government by challenging the partitioning presupposed by the latter (Section 6). In conclusion, I summarize the points of the preceding analysis.

2. Data and method

The data are video-recordings of monthly meetings that the residents of a town in Fukushima prefecture hold to organize various events for local children.² An evacuation order was issued to the town immediately after a series of explosions at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in 2011; the order was completely lifted in 2014. Since December 2016, my colleagues and I have been video-recording all the meetings. I went through the video-

recordings of nine meetings held between December 2016 and May 2018 (about 20 hours in total), in which the residents discussed the general purposes of the group or necessary arrangements of the planned events, and chose the segments that I will present in the following sections; in these segments, the issue of the partitioning of a population appeared to surface in interaction to a certain degree. I transcribed them using Jefferson's (2004) transcription system and analyzed them using conversation analysis (Sacks, 1992; Schegloff, 2007). We obtained informed consent from all research participants. I anonymized all proper names, including names of local communities and organizations, when I transcribed the video-recordings.

3. Reaching a mutual agreement via the partitioning of a population

In this section, I illustrate how participants reach an agreement through the consistent partitioning of the relevant population. In each example, one participant advances a proposal by reference to a category collection and another agrees with it by reference to another category collection; these category collections differentially categorize the participants, but consistently divide them into subgroups. As Example 1 begins, Jingo (JN), a tree-climbing expert, proposes the idea of organizing a tree-climbing tournament for children as a festival in the town. Then, Eita (ET) offers an agreement (line 04) before Jingo makes it explicit that he is making a proposal by requesting the recipients' views ("What do you think?" line 05). Jingo's proposal takes the form of reporting what he was wildly imagining so that it may be easier to reject (via admitting the irrational aspect of the proposal), but this form also sharply

invokes Jingo's identity as "tree-climbing expert" (i.e., the one whose imagination can go beyond usual thoughts), thereby partitioning the relevant population into a tree-climbing expert and tree-climbing laypersons. I present the example by dividing it into two parts (Excerpts 1a and 1b). (Takeo [TK] is another resident member of the group; Ai is a support organization member.) In all the excerpts, below a Romanized version of the original Japanese, an approximate English translation is presented.

(1a) [Dec 2016]

- 01 JN: ee::: (.) omatsuri teki ni dekitara
Umm (.) if ((we)) could do it like a festival,
- 02 ii na tte katteni moosoo shitemashita, ima.
that would be nice. This was what I was wildly imagining.
- 03 TK: soo (ɾ)
Right, ()
- 04 ET: |soo dakara-
|Right, so-
- 05 JN: L_doo desuka.
What do you think?
- 06 ET: n::n. ɾdakara nde: †XXXX kai hajimatte kara=
Yeah. |So, and it was after we started XXXX group
((this group))
- 07 TK: L(n ii ii)
- 08 ET: nan'dayo ne? ano:ɾ: Jingo san to:: (.)
that uh I got acquainted with Jingo-san.
- 09 AI: L_{nn} nn
Uh-huh,
- ((About 50 lines omitted, during which ET explains that the youth division of the local chamber of commerce and industry has been discussing how they can make the community more attractive to local children.))
- 10 ET: maa minna kore kodom- kod-kosodate: sedai:ɾ:
Well, everyone here is in children- chil- |
in the parenting generation, |
- 11 AI: L_{n::n}
Mm-hmm,

- 12 ET: dashi:
and
- 13 (0.2)
- 14 ET: .t sooyuu bubun de? zehi sooyuu tsurii kuraimingu
 15 nanka ꞑmo:ne:? yatte morai nagara::?
**In this connection, please, ((I)) would like also
 that tree-climbing done, and,**
- 16 AI: ʌnn nn
Yes, yes.
- 17 TK: n: ꞑ:n
Yeah.

Eita first mentions the fact that some of the participants, including himself, are currently in the “parenting generation” (lines 10 and 12). Then, in lines 14–15, Eita proceeds to accept Jingo’s proposal, marking the acceptance with the emphasis token *zehi* (translated as “please”).

On the one hand, via the construction of his acceptance (“please, ((I)) would like also that tree-climbing done” in lines 14–15), Eita also partitions the relevant population into “tree-climbing expert” and others, positioning Jingo on the side of “tree-climbing expert” and himself on the side of others. Note also that Eita positions himself as a beneficiary regarding the proposed event (see Clayman & Heritage, 2015); the original meaning of the word *morai*, translated as “would like ... done,” is “receiving” or “being given.” The token *zehi* (“please”) emphasizes the speaker’s displayed beneficiary stance. On the other hand, by characterizing some participants as “currently parenting,” Eita partitions the population into two sides: “currently parenting” and others.

However, at the beginning of line 14, the fact that Eita and some other participants are currently parenting is marked as a reason (*soyuu bubun de* “in this connection”) for the

the town if there is something that they can boast about, and that tree climbing could be one such thing. Then, in lines 26 and 28, he connects this idea to activities of the youth division of the local chamber of commerce and industry. Thus, Eita presents his view in the description of the youth division's hope (*moraereba na* "if we could have ... [that would be nice]" in line 24) regarding the children's future behavior. Here, the parents' beneficiary position is clear. Furthermore, this hope is characterized as related to the youth division's activities; far from being Eita's individual hope, it is attributed to an official local organization for young residents. The hope is not only distributed among the youth division members but also grounded in their ordinary activities.

Eita's mentioning of "parenting" and "tree climbing" partitions the population in different ways; that is, "parenting" partitions it into "parents" and "nonparents," and "tree climbing" partitions it into "tree-climbing experts" and "tree-climbing laypersons." However, this partitioning is consistent (see Sacks, 1992, vol.1, pp. 317 and 592–596, for the notion of "partitioning *constancy*"³) in that it consistently positions Jingo on one side and Eita and others from the parenting generation on the other side. As a result, a "parent" who is a "tree-climbing layperson," on behalf of local parents who are also laypeople with regard to tree climbing, agrees as a *beneficiary* with the proposal (to do tree climbing for young children) offered by a "tree-climbing expert" who is not a "parent" of young children. In fact, in line 29, Eita produces *zehi* ("please"), once again to explicitly position himself as a beneficiary. Thus, Jingo and Eita have reached a mutual agreement about a possible event for children in a consistent partitioning.

We can examine more complex cases in terms of partitioning. When a proposal is

agreed with for the first time (by Sango), this agreement is reached in the consistent partitioning of a population, but this partitioning is challenged by another (Jingo) while the consistency of partitioning is maintained. In Example 2, the participants discuss the necessary arrangements for the planned hike with local children. Eita proposes putting up signboards for the local “mothers” who will take their children by car to the meeting place, while pointing to the announcement of the event hung on the wall (lines 01–16). He appears to address his proposal mainly to Jingo, the chair of the group, sitting in front of him, by directing his gaze toward Jingo at the end of the proposal (line 16), while occasionally gazing at Sango and Shinji, who are senior forestry professionals, during the production of the proposal. (Harada [HR] is the leader of the support organization.)

(2) [May 2017]

01 ET: °nani ato so-° sono soo::gee: shite morat:::ta okaasan datte
02 maa: shuu_goo basho?

**And, umm, for the mothers who will drop off the children,
the meeting place?**

03 JN: ʌaa hai hai
 Oh yes.

04 (.)

05 SH: hai hai
 Right,

06 SH: nꞵn
 yeah

07 ET: ʌma' fu(h)moto tte na(h)tte(h)nde: .hh (1.2) maa
08 fumoto no sono ki- ano:-:
 **is only indicated as the foot of the mountain, so
beyond the foot of the mountain, well-**

09 (0.2)

10 SH: n: ꞵ:_

11 ET: ʌfumoto tte: (.) ya- azu- a kore koeta- (0.2) saki no
 the foot of the mountain means ((the place)) that fur-

end (line 16). Eita has also mitigated it by adding the continuing marker *de* (“so”) in continuous intonation, thus leaving the current unit incomplete as if leaving its completion to the recipient.

However, a closer examination brings another aspect of the exchange into view; Jingo challenges a partitioning. We make several observations. First, Eita’s proposal is based on his inference about “mothers’” abilities (line 01), implying that he is in a good position to make such an inference and invoking his identity of parent and thereby a member of the parenting generation. Second, note that Sango (SN), not Jingo, agrees to Eita’s proposal (line 18) even before Eita completes his turn. Sango’s thought expressed in his agreement is designedly elicited by the proposal (*aa* “oh” line 18) but marked as unambiguously assertive with the terminal assertive marker *dana*. Sango, Shinji (SH), and Jingo are forestry professionals; at the age of approximately 70, Sango and Shinji have been working in the local mountains for decades, while Jingo, around 50, moved to the community after the disaster in 2011. Now Eita’s proposal begins to be seen as made from the standpoint of the parenting generation, but by one who is less knowledgeable about the local mountains; the mitigation at its end, together with many hesitations during it, embodies his less-knowledgeable stance. The assertive nature of Sango’s agreement embodies his knowledgeability about the mountains, independent of the parents’ viewpoint. In this fashion, at the moment when Sango offers an agreement to Eita’s proposal (line 18), the relevant population is consistently partitioned into “parents/forestry nonprofessionals” and “nonparents/forestry professionals”; Eita and other members of the parenting generation, on one hand, and Jingo, Sango and Shinji, on the other, are consistently differentially grouped

together.⁴ However, Jingo's positioning in lines 19–20 challenges this partitioning; he positions himself as one who is expected to make all potentially necessary arrangements and is entitled to make them without discussing them publicly. Jingo's agreement even takes the form of reporting his independent decision: to put up a couple of signposts that happen to be available to him. Moreover, Sango's agreement is addressed to Jingo and Jingo's agreement to Sango via their respective gaze directions. Sango's agreement in which the elicited thought is assertively expressed implies a self-complaint about the failure to have realized the issue on the side of the knowledgeable professionals, including Jingo. With his agreement, Jingo also contradicts this implication, as the chair of the group who takes good care of all potentially necessary arrangements. However, insofar as Jingo positions himself in a position that only one person occupies (i.e., the chair of the group), the consistency of partitioning is maintained in a new form (i.e., “parents/forestry nonprofessionals,” “nonparents/forestry professionals,” and “the chair of the group” who happens to be a nonparent/forestry professional).

4. Disagreement on partitioning

Partitioning can thus be negotiated in the course of interaction. Example 3 is another case in point, in which a request for confirmation proposes to partition the relevant population into “parents” and “nonparents” but the requested confirmation is provided by challenging the partitioning. It may appear to be another typical case of negotiating epistemic rights (Hayano, 2013; Heritage & Raymond, 2005; Raymond & Heritage, 2006), but it is more like

The main part of Shinji's request for confirmation (line 06) hearably builds on Takeo's potential assertion (line 05); Takeo intervenes by adding "don't know" to complete Shinji's previous turn precisely at the moment Shinji says "those children, about such charcoal." The way in which Takeo intervenes, that is, completing Shinji's ongoing utterance regarding "children" as an assertion, invokes Takeo's identity as a parent. In this context, the Japanese word *desho* (translated as "right"), pronounced with a downward intonation toward the end of Shinji's request (line 06), indicates that Shinji requests a confirmation about what belongs to the addressee's domain. In this request for confirmation, Shinji hearably proposes that Takeo should be positioned as one who is entitled to provide the confirmation about it because Takeo has direct access to it as part of his ordinary life, while Shinji positions himself as an adult contrasted with children, having some common knowledge of the local children's current situation. In response (lines 08 and 11), however, Takeo offers an agreement in the form of a counter-request for confirmation, by marking it as a confirmation request with *bai* (= *janai*), translated as "right" (line 11). Takeo agrees with Shinji about the children's knowledge of charcoal, but disagrees with the proposed partitioning; he appears to reposition himself as another adult who has only common knowledge of it, that is, as one who is merely entitled to speak of children's knowledge of charcoal via inference under the given circumstances. In fact, in response to Shinji's request for confirmation about children's knowledge of how to use charcoal, Takeo requests confirmation about their knowledge of how to *make* it ("Before that, they don't know how to make it, right?" line 11). How to use it is potentially embedded as part of their ordinary life, but how to make it belongs to the domain of common knowledge. Furthermore, Takeo introduces the children's lack of

knowledge of how to make it with *somosomo* (“before that” lines 08 and 11), implying that knowing how to make it should precede knowing how to use it; that is, he addresses the knowledge of charcoal not as it is related to their life, but as pure knowledge of charcoal as a produced substance. Thus, the negotiation between Shinji and Takeo concerns not who knows better but what kinds of knowledge they have; that is, whether Takeo is positioned as a parent (of particular children) or as an adult (contrasted with children in general—i.e., on the same side of the partition as Shinji).

Now we have another distinction in addition to the one between agreement and disagreement with the provided proposal, statement, assessment, or the like. Even when mutual agreement has been reached, the participants may nevertheless not agree about the proposed partitioning. In the next section, I examine a case in which the participants reach an agreement of consistent partitioning through a series of negotiations.

5. Maintaining the consistency of partitioning

Example 4 is excerpted from a meeting in which the participants discussed the planned mountain hike with children, the same meeting as Example 2. Because of its length, I will present this example by dividing it into four segments (Excerpts 4a–4d). At the beginning of the example, Eita proposes dividing the children into small groups (lines 01 through 14). If one looks only at Eita’s proposal and Jingo’s agreement with it (Excerpt 4a), there may appear to be a conflict between them regarding deontic and epistemic claims. However, the examination of the subsequent development of interaction (Excerpts 4b–4d) reveals that the

ground for Jingo's agreement is different from the ground for Eita's proposal. In advancing the ground for his proposal, Eita avoids the partitioning based on his identity as a parent.

(4a) [May 2017]

- 01 ET: nankoka ni koo wakete-
 ((We will)) divide ((them)) into several ((groups)) when
- 02 (2.2) ((ET vertically swings his left hand several times
 with the palm down and fingers slightly folded inward.))
- 03 ET: nnoboru yoona kanji:-
 |we walk up ((the mountain)) or something like that-
- 04 JN: Lraa::_
 Oh
- 05 (.)
- 06 SH: nn::n
 Mm-hmm
- 07 (1.2) ((JN chews food in his mouth while slightly
 touching his mouth with his left ring finger.))
- 08 JN: aa aa aa raa
 Oh. |
- 09 ET: Lno hoo ga ii no ka_
 ((which)) would be better, or
- 10 (2.8) ((JN looks like he is thinking.))
- 11 ET: chotto jika:nrsa ja neekedo.
 With time differences, or something,
- 12 JN: Lnn nn nn::n
 Mm-hmm,
- 13 (1.4)
- 14 ET: kumiwake:: mitaina kanji ude:
 with grouping, or something,
- 15 (0.2)
- 16 JN: aa soo <so'e ii kamo shirenai'su une::
 Oh, right, that may be good.
- 17 ET: n::n
 Yeah.
- 18 (0.4)
- 19 SH: n::n
 Mm-hmm,

20 JN: kyo- n::n (nijut::teki de) noborinagara chotto
 21 kangaetan' desu kedo::
Today- yeah () while walking in the mountains,
I was thinking
 22 (0.4)
 23 JN: kodomotachi futari zutsu: (.) peaa ni <sashi te>
that ((we can)) put the children into pairs,
 24 SH: nn
Yeah
 25 (1.8)
 26 JN: GHnh ano (1.0) tsuneni otagai: (0.4) kini shitero ↓to.
GHnh ((cough)) uh (1.0) and ((tell them)) to watch
each other.
 27 (.)

In line 16, Jingo offers an agreement. While he downgrades this agreement by adding *kamo shirenai* (“may”), he indicates (with *aa soo* “oh, right”) that he has independent access to the ground for Eita’s proposal. Then, from line 20 onwards, Jingo provides support for Eita’s proposal, by citing what he was thinking while on the site for the planned event (i.e., grouping children into pairs to have them watch each other). Given Eita is the father of children who will participate in the event, Eita’s proposal may implicate both epistemic and deontic claims: claims of better access to the circumstances surrounding the children who will participate, and the superior right to propose things directly related to the children. However, given that Jingo is a forestry expert, working in the mountains ordinarily, what Jingo does in addressing these claims may have two aspects. First, he may make a counter-claim of the superior right to propose things directly related to walking in the mountains. In fact, he claims that what Eita has proposed is what he was thinking independently of Eita’s proposal. Further, Jingo serves as the chair of the group and may be expected to have the deontic rights and responsibilities regarding the group’s decisions. Second, Jingo positions

himself as having experienced the site for the event very recently (“Today- yeah () while walking in the mountains, I was thinking” lines 20–21). Recent experience may contest the entitlement claim grounded in any identity; that is, anyone who has experienced things very recently may have the superior entitlement to talk about them independently of who they are.

Thus, it *may* appear that Jingo contests the deontic and epistemic claims implicated in Eita’s proposal. One may also note that the Eita’s proposal (lines 01 through 14) is constructed as indefinite in the following ways. First, in line 03, the ongoing turn-constructional unit is possibly complete (“or something like that”), but it lacks the indicator of the action type. Second, in line 09, a phrase (introduced with the post-positional *no*) that indicates the action type (“would be better”) is appended to Eita’s previous utterance, but its end is left grammatically uncompleted with *ka* (“or”). Third, after a long silence in line 10, that is, an observable lack of uptake of the proposal, Eita adds a ground for the proposal (line 11) and recasts it in a different expression (line 14). This recasting of the proposal, once again, lacks the indicator of the action type. Thus, the entire construction of Eita’s proposal may also appear sensitive to the potential conflict implicated by the proposal.

However, an examination of the exchanges between Eita and Jingo that occur 33 lines later (Excerpt 4b) sheds light on another aspect of their interaction: maintaining the consistency of partitioning. Insofar as the partitioning proposed in Jingo’s agreement may divide the relevant population into “parents/forestry nonprofessionals” and “nonparents/forestry professionals,” the partitioning would be consistent. However, this partitioning would be potentially inconsistent with the fact that all the group members are equally responsible for the concrete event that they jointly organize.

- 33 fun fun°
Mm-hmm, [Lines 32-33]
- 34 ET: choko(h)tto aruki mashita |kedo ta|bun kekko- ano=
and walked around a little, and |
- 35 JN: |
 Lee
Yes,
- 36 ET: =saigon' toko ga kekoo kitsuin'su yo↑ne::?
the last slope was steeper than expected.
- 37 JN: a soꞑo'su ne::
Yes, that's true.
- 38 SH: |nn
- 39 JN: ghhn ((cough))
- 40 SH: nn
Mm
- 41 JN: as'ko- rasoko wa kitsui desu yo ne
It was steep there.
- 42 ET: |dakara anohen ni natte kuruto tabun::
So, ((when they go)) around there,
- 43 (1.2)
- 44 ET: ikeru ko wa gongon ikeru shi:
**((the physically)) strong ones will go like gongon
 ((mimetic)), and**
- 45 JN: aa hai |hai hai
Oh, I see.
- 46 RS: |n:n nn
Mm-hmm,
- 47 ET: ikenee ko wa kekoo (.) chotto zutsu chotto zutsu
 48 | () nattekuru to omounde:
**|((the physically)) weak ones can only go bit by bit,
 |I think.**
- 49 JN: |aa:: soo'sune
Oh, I see.

Once again, the clarification of the original point may implicate the claim of the superior right to talk about children as a parent. To avoid this implication, Eita appears to manage *not* to position himself as a *caring parent*; that is, Eita grounds his view about

differences in walking speed among children in his *recent experience* (“today”) of the site (lines 30–36), in the same manner as Jingo did in Excerpt 4a. If Eita spoke as a caring parent and Jingo as the event’s chief organizer and a forestry expert, the *partitioning* of the population would be consistent (i.e., Eita and other parents are forestry laypersons while Jingo, who happens to be the chief organizer, and other nonparents are forestry experts). However, this partitioning would contradict the partitioning in which all the group members are more or less equally responsible *co-organizers* of the particular event in question. It would not only position Eita and Jingo as being on different sides, but also position Eita, a father, as a beneficiary of the event together with the children. In the interactionally contingent development of interaction (i.e., in the course of the justification work for the proposal), Eita may try to maintain the consistency of the partitioning so that Eita and Jingo are positioned on the same side against the children, although some differences remain uncontested between Eita and Jingo with respect to who is more responsible and more knowledgeable and who will benefit more (see also Note 4).

In summary, in the course of the exchanges reproduced in Excerpts 4a–4d, Eita simultaneously addresses two interactional issues that are contradictory in the current context. Even though Eita and Jingo are in agreement that the children should be divided into small groups, there remains a disagreement about the ground for the division, which might be consequential for how to group the children. The first issue was how to render the ground acceptable to Jingo (and other members). The second issue was how to avoid positioning himself as a caring parent when addressing the first issue, that is, when advancing the ground (i.e., differential physical conditions of individual children). What we have observed are

practices by which Eita managed to reach an optimal simultaneous solution of these two issues.

6. Challenging a proposed partitioning

In this section, I examine a case from a different context, one in which a proposed partitioning is challenged in an explicit confrontation.⁵ At the meeting in which the residents and support organization members review the mountain hike in the previous month, four visitors (labeled G1–G4) from a national government office participate as observers. First, G2 proposes, with his inquiry, the partitioning between the local group members and other residents (Excerpt 5). Then, after this partitioning is challenged by the group members, G2 proposes a new partitioning, one between those who are knowledgeable about radiation (including both the community's residents and the government staff) and those who are not (Excerpt 6a). Finally, the group members also challenge this new partitioning (Excerpt 6b).

Just prior to Excerpt 5, G1 inquires about whether any of the children's "guardians" (i.e., parents) have expressed concerns about radiation (given that radiation is higher in the mountains than in residential areas). In response, Takeo first explains that they held a public meeting at the local elementary school and informed the parents about the radiation in the mountains that they had measured for themselves; he responds that no parents have expressed concerns about radiation. As Excerpt 5 begins, G2 asks a follow-up question. (The exchanges in which Jingo hands to G1 and G3 the document that they distributed to the parents at the school have been omitted.)

(5) [Jun 2017]

- 01 G2: >su'imasen< m-motto tsukkonde >hana(h)shitai- hashitai
Excuse me, to go deeper into this,
- 02 G2: to omoun' desu kedo< .h (sorette) sono fukee no kata
I would like to discuss more. .h That is,
- 03 G2: ga: hooshasen te yuu mono o <shittete> kowagatte nai
 04 noka >soretomo< motomotoo .h
**umm whether those parents do have knowledge of radiation
 and therefore do not have fear, or .h**
- 05 G2: >zenz-< attemo sore o kini shiteri-
**not-, no matter how much ((radiation)) may be,
 they are just not at all concerned-**
- 06 ? : LGHh GHh ((cough))
- 07 TK: ri'ya kini wa shitette omou yo_
|Well ((they)) are concerned, though, I think.
- 08 ET: L(kini wa na-)
((They)) are concern-
- 09 G2: kini wa rishiteru
((They)) are concerned.
- 10 TK: Laa-:-:-: shoojiki
((Untranslatable)) honestly.
- 11 ET: mo-
- 12 TK: nn nn:ri:n
Yeah, yeah.
- 13 ET: Lmochiron rikini suru rijiki wa owat::rita
Of course, the time for being concerned was over.
- 14 TK: Ltada Lnn::Ln Lowatta
Only, Yeah Was over.
- 15 nn nn n::n
Right.
- 16 G2: aa naruhodo
Oh I see. |
- 17 ET: Ljuumin toshite
As residents.

G2 interprets Takeo's report (that no parents expressed concerns) as the lack of concern among the parents and inquires about the reason for it, by asking whether it is because the parents know that the level of radiation is adequately low in the local mountains, or because they are indifferent to the level of radiation (lines 01 through 05). Instead of answering the question, Takeo denies its presupposition by introducing his response with the denial marker *iya* ('ya; literally "no") (see Hayashi & Kushida, 2013); he says that they *are* concerned, although they do not express it (line 07), "concerned" being contrastively marked by *wa* (translated as "though").

In spite of his denial of G2's presupposition, at this moment, Takeo constructs his response as a conjuncture through his terminal *omou yo* ("I think," line 07) and, in so doing, still conforms to the partitioning proposed by G2's inquiry, that is, the one between the local group members and the local parents (or other residents). In his inquiry, G2 requests an assessment of the adequacy of the local parents' knowledge. Insofar as the inquiry builds on Takeo's response to G1's prior question, G2 now assumes that Takeo is entitled to offer such an assessment. This assumption appears to set a partition between those entitled to provide such an assessment (i.e., the local group members) and those whose knowledge is being assessed (i.e., other local parents or residents). In other words, G2's inquiry partitions the relevant population in terms of the asymmetrical distribution of specific knowledge (i.e., who is more knowledgeable and entitled to assess others' knowledge) and positions the local group members (together with the government staff) as adequately knowledgeable vis-a-vis other local parents who received an explanation of the radiation conditions of the mountain by the group members. The construction of Takeo's response as a conjecture contributes to

Although much of what G2 said in response has been omitted, he makes two points. First, people cannot avoid receiving radiation in the natural course of living, but they do not know it. Second, they complain about what the nuclear power plant accident has brought, although the amount of the emitted radiation is not much different from that which they receive in the natural course of life. Now he introduces a new partitioning of the relevant population: between those who are knowledgeable about radiation (including the government staff and the residents) and those who are not. He implies that the residents know enough about the radiation condition and therefore do not complain (or express concern) about it. In this new partitioning, the residents (not only the local group members) are positioned on the same side as the government staff vis-a-vis other people who are not knowledgeable.

However, in lines 18–19, Eita challenges G2. The construction of his challenge is prominent in two respects. First, he contests G2’s conflation of the necessity of getting along with radiation with the lack of fears or concerns about radiation, by denying that the residents have no fears or concerns, as G2 assumes. This is precisely what Takeo did earlier in line 07 of Excerpt 5. In other words, Eita returns to this earlier moment and thereby invalidates what G2 has said and done in his explanation (lines 10 through 17 of Excerpt 6a), including the renewed partitioning proposed there.

Second, Eita does not make conjectures about how other residents (or local parents) feel; he rather requests agreement from Takeo in his turn-ending *yone* (“right?”, line 19), and Takeo agrees with Eita before Eita’s current utterance turns out to be a request for agreement (line 20), using the same strong term *uso* (“false,” literally “a lie”), as Eita used. A similar construction of disagreement with G2 is also observable in the subsequent exchange in lines

“unquestionable” (line 26) and *dareshimo iu* “everybody says so” (line 27), respectively. In particular, note that the extreme-case formulation *dareshimo* (“everybody”) (Pomerantz, 1986) is a type of category-relevant usage (Sacks, 1975), referencing a limited categorial domain of population, that is, the residents. This usage of “everybody,” presenting all the incumbents of the category as one unit, creates a clear partition between the residents and others. Eita and Takeo claim the entitlement to speak about the issue on behalf of *all* the residents against the government staff.

In Excerpts 5, 6a and 6b, Takeo and Eita challenge the government staff’s partitioning between the local group members (together with the government staff) and other residents (Excerpt 5), and their partitioning between those with adequate knowledge (including the staff and the residents) and those without it (the majority of ordinary citizens) (Excerpts 6a and 6b). The partitioning that Eita and Takeo propose distinguishes those living in a community affected by the nuclear power plant explosions from other people who may be knowledgeable about radiation.

We begin to see another aspect of the complexity of knowledge. Between the government staff and the residents, there are no conflicts regarding who is more entitled to speak about local parents’ feelings and knowledge. Eita and Takeo appear to resist being positioned together with those knowledgeable about radiation. Of course, they are adequately knowledgeable about radiation. However, they appear to resist the reduction of the issue of their life in an affected community to one of adequate knowledge, the lack of which might imply the illegitimacy of having (or not having) concerns about radiation (see Nishizaka, 2017). In other words, they may be trying to give voice to their lifeworld

experiences (see Mishler, 1984).

7. Conclusion

There are three analytic merits of focusing on partitioning practices. First, relationships among participants relative to knowledge and responsibility are complex. As we saw in Example 1, the categories “expert in tree climbing,” “parent of young children,” and “youth division member” (of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry) belong to different category collections. The standardized relations of entitlement between the categories within a particular collection differ from collection to collection. However, if the relevant population can be partitioned *consistently* by these different category collections, the complex relations of entitlement implicated in different category collections can be (if they are not always) stably distributed between both sides of the partition in a manner relevant to the ongoing activity. Focusing on partitioning practices may allow us to discuss the participants’ management of the complex relations of their entitlements perspicuously.

Second, as I suggested in the introduction, different epistemic and deontic domains may be incommensurable. For example, who knows better how children are likely to behave on the mountain trails, parents or forestry experts? Is it their *knowledge* about their children that entitles the parents to speak about them, or their life with the children? The participants may disagree about how to partition the relevant population not because of a conflict regarding who has superior epistemic or deontic rights with respect to an object or event but because of an incongruence regarding what *kind* of knowledge or responsibility they are

expected to have. Focusing on partitioning may allow us to discuss the distribution of incommensurable rights and responsibilities among participants.⁶

Finally, the partitioning of a population is not necessarily based on membership *categories*. For example, the population may be divided into those who do and do not have recent experience with something, but this division may not be based on categories as *general* terms for classification of people. Moreover, when Eita and Takeo in Excerpts 5, 6a, and 6b try to position themselves as those (parents) living in an affected community, they appear even to resist being placed into any categories provided by the common natural language and generally (and morally) connected to distributions of knowledge, rights, and responsibilities. However, they still try to position themselves somewhere in the partitioned population.

This study only focuses on one specific context, that is, one in which local residents with different identities jointly organize events for local children. However, the practices that Wootton (1977) described were used to achieve the sharing of experiences in psychiatric group therapy sessions also include various types of management of partitioning. Some patients may cancel the partitioning implicated by their relevant membership categories by adding prefaces to their remarks, such as “Well, of course, I’m an older man than you but . . .” (p. 342), or others may propose a new partitioning by invoking a “duplicatively organized” membership categorization device such a family (Sacks, 1972b) — for example, a patient noted that he was not only an old man with problems but also a father to “put a father’s point of view” to a young female patient (p. 344). Under which conditions the issue of partitioning may surface in interaction remains for subsequent studies. Certainly, all

practical issues related to epistemic or deontic dimensions may not be addressed via the partitioning of a population. Nevertheless, the examination of partitioning practices provides an analytic framework in which aspects of what has been discussed under the rubric of epistemics and deontics in interaction can be rearranged. In future studies, partitioning practices may reveal further complex aspects.

Notes

¹ In the tradition of conversation analysis, the distribution of knowledge among participants has been recognized as one of the most important resources for organizing interactions; for example, see C. Goodwin (1979), Pomerantz (1980), and Sacks (1992).

² I am grateful to Masato Komuro, Satomi Kuroshima, and Masafumi Sunaga for the data collection.

³ In this study, I use “consistency” rather than “constancy” to avoid the connotation of being temporally invariable. Note also that partitioning consistency is independent of following the “consistency rule” (Sacks, 1972a, 1972b); even when categories are selected from different collections to categorize members of the same relevant population (i.e., the selection of categories is not consistent in this respect), the partitioning of the population can remain consistent.

⁴ One may notice that Eita adds *moratta* (literally, “receiving”) to the main verb that indicates the mothers’ act of dropping off (*soogee shite*) in line 01, thereby, positioning the mothers as benefactors of the group. In fact, there are many residents who are not group

members but without whose assistance the group's plan would be difficult to execute. The partitioning proposed in lines 01–02 is complex in that it creates more than two divisions. However, what is important is the fact that Eita chooses the category “mothers” for those who help the group in dropping off the participant children. The category “mothers” excludes from its potential incumbents the group members (all male — there may be a gender issue) as well as forestry professionals who are also parents and, thereby, maintains the parent group members (fathers) in a privileged position to infer its incumbents' (the mothers') situation while, with the expression *moratta* (“receiving”), maintaining the partition that divides the group members jointly responsible for the planned event from the outside helpers. This complex partitioning is still consistent; the relevant population is consistently distributed into the created divisions.

⁵ I owe many thanks to Masato Komuro, Satomi Kuroshima, and Masafumi Sunaga for drawing my attention to these interesting exchanges. I am also indebted to them for inspiring me through the discussion on the exchanges.

⁶ The same may be true for “benefactive” domains (Clayman & Heritage, 2015). Participants may face the issue of what *kind* of benefactive relationship they are expected to have, rather than the issue of who benefits more.

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