

Paper for DISCOURSE STUDIES

Title: Seeing and Knowing in Interaction: Two Distinct Resources for Action Construction

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“Conversing while massaging: Multidimensional asymmetries of multiple activities in interaction,” *Research on Language and Social Interaction* (with M. Sunaga, 2015), and “The moral construction of worry about radiation exposure: Emotion, knowledge, and tests,” *Discourse & Society* (2017).

Abstract

Using the methodology of conversation analysis to examine interactions in outdoor activities, this study explores how participants specifically *see* an object or event in the development of an activity. In particular, the distinction between (visual) perception and knowledge is oriented to by the participants as a practical issue that informs their alternative action constructions. This distinction matters as a resource for implementing an action in an interaction. The data are in Japanese with English translations.

Keywords: Perception, Knowledge, Conversation analysis, Epistemic resources, Action construction, Projects, Fukushima

1. Introduction

Most (or perhaps all) human activities are simultaneously based on perception and knowledge; even a simple activity such as walking requires complex processes.

Walking calls for the collection of information via perception about the environment, whose configurations are continuously changing with the movement of the body. It also necessitates the knowledge of where the walker is, where they are heading, how they will get to the destination, and so on. However, in this study, I explore the manners in which an action is constructed differently according to whether the construction is *specifically* perception-based.

Knowledge and perception should be conceptually distinguished. *Seeing* a tree in a garden currently in front of one's eyes and *knowing* that there is a tree in a garden, whether through someone else's information or one's own past experience, are different. (Note that in this article, I only address "seeing" in the perceptual sense.) This difference is not only the matter of who has better access to the object in question; rather, seeing and knowing belong to different conceptual orders. For example, it may not even make sense to say, "I know that is a tree," when referring to a tree that I see in front of my own eyes (see Wittgenstein, 1969: §§ 347 & 467–468).

Not only can perception be a source of knowledge, but it also depends on knowledge. For example, if one does not have the concept of a stamen, one cannot see stamens distinguished from a pistil (Sharrock & Coulter, 1998: 157). Goodwin (1994) has also shown that knowledge is involved in a specialized perception, or what he has referred to as "professional vision." Specifically, experts can see a person's bodily movements in a particular way because of their special

knowledge. In these cases, I may say, while seeing the stamen or the movement in front of me, that I know that this is a stamen or a particular type of movement. However, we do not need any special knowledge to perceive depth and size, although such perception is still subject to the *influence* of knowledge to a certain degree (as suggested by hollow-face illusions). In fact, it may not make sense to say, while sitting on a chair and seeing two flowers in front of me, that I know the smaller flower is planted closer to me than the other, although after leaving the scene, I can say, “I know the smaller flower is planted closer to the chair than the other because I just saw them while sitting on it.” Perception is a direct embodied involvement with the perceived world (and to perceive the world, we do not have to think about it; rather, we are, so to speak, invited to attend to it as it is perceived [Merleau-Ponty, 1989: 54]); therefore, seeing may still be a conceptually distinct epistemic resource for organizing action in interaction.

In this study, I demonstrate that participants use perception and knowledge differentially (i.e., as two distinct epistemic resources) for constructing an action in interaction, and the demonstration may provide empirical support for the speculative line of thought in the previous paragraph. Perception, and particularly visual perception, has been a main topic of concern in the analysis of embodied interactions. In a series of work on vision in interaction, C. Goodwin and M. H. Goodwin (Goodwin, 1994, 1996; Goodwin & Goodwin, 1996) have shown that participants in an activity make what they see accessible to each other and use this mutual accessibility of what they see as an important resource for the organization of their activity. They have further shown that what the participants see is organized in specific manners relevant to the current status of their unfolding activity. This is done through various (discursive and

embodied) practices in environments in which the participants' bodies and various materials are temporally and spatially arranged in manners appropriate to the ongoing activity (see also Nishizaka, 2000, 2017). For example, a pointing gesture may visually structure the environment in a specific way when it is juxtaposed with talk (such as "This is X" and "Here is X") as well as a portion of the environment; while disambiguating each other, talk and the gesture, juxtaposed with each other and the environment, indicate how to see the environment. Such visual structuring is not accomplished by an isolated actor but is instead only possible within a particular arrangement of multiple bodies; the pointing gesture has to be made in the other's visual field while the participants assume certain postures and make certain movements to complete their activity (see Goodwin, 2003, 2007; Nishizaka, 2003, 2006). In the same vein as the Goodwins' work, I will demonstrate that seeing an object in front of one is a constitutive part of how participants implement their actions in the local order of an activity.

In the conversation analytic literature, the epistemic dimension of interaction has also been demonstrated to operate in various contexts. For example, in the context of informing sequences, Heritage (2012a) has shown that the distribution of knowledge, rather than grammatical forms (e.g., interrogative, declarative, etc.), contributes to the formation of an action type. Working within the same context, Heritage (2012b) has also demonstrated that the asymmetrical distribution of knowledge moves the ongoing action sequence forward, such that the sequence develops toward the reduction of the asymmetry. In the context of assessment, this particular dimension can be a practical issue for participants in terms of who has superior access to the object or event being assessed (Heritage & Raymond, 2005); who is agreeing and who is being agreed with is also a

negotiable issue in this context (see also Schegloff, 1996). The domain of repair organization is another major context in which the epistemic dimension can be operative. In multi-party conversations, the selection of who provides the repair that has been initiated by a participant may be regulated by who is more knowledgeable about or familiar with the repairable item (Bolden, 2012, 2013). Repair initiations implemented by a partial repeat of the preceding turn at talk may have different meanings according to whether the speaker of the repair-initiating partial repeat is expectedly knowledgeable about the repairable item (Robinson, 2013); if the speaker is expected to be knowledgeable, the partial repeat is treated by its recipient as “disagreement.” In another line of research, some scholars have shown that the Japanese language has specific linguistic items indexing epistemic relationships between the speaker and the recipient (Hayano, 2011) or a specific linguistic form that marks epistemic distance, in contrast to social distance, from an object being talked about (Kushida, 2015). What these studies have in common is a focus on the organization of talk in interaction. However, more relevant to this study, Fox and Heinemann (2015) have demonstrated that gestures may differentially embody the speaker’s epistemic stance. In other words, the different specificities of gestures made in the vicinity of an object may advance different claims regarding how knowledgeable the speaker is about the object.

In spite of the accumulation of research on the epistemic dimension of interaction, not much attention has been paid to the distinction between perception and knowledge. In what follows, after describing the data and method (Section 2), I will first illustrate how the distinction between specifically perception-based and information- or knowledge-based action constructions works in the organization

of action; this illustration provides the basis for the subsequent analysis (Section 3). In the next two sections, I will demonstrate that the distinction between knowledge-based and perception-based action constructions is oriented to by the participants as the source of a potential conflict. Although the participants raise the same concern (and are in agreement on it), one participant may resist the other by constructing his concern raising as specifically based on perception (Section 4). One participant may resist the ascribability of a type of action to a series of the other participant's turns at talk by disattending to the connection of these utterances to the perceptual field (Section 5). In the concluding section, I will summarize the points of the preceding analysis.

2. Data and Method

My colleagues and I have been video recording interactions in various settings since 2014 in a town that was issued an evacuation order immediately after a series of explosions at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant after the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011. After the order was lifted in 2014, many (allegedly about 80 percent) of the residents returned. Since December of 2016, my colleagues and I have been regularly visiting a group of residents who meet on a monthly basis to organize various events for local children to promote their commitment to the community (which, as a typical rural community, had suffered depopulation even before the disaster). I reviewed the video recordings of three outdoor events that the group organized and one inspection tour for a coming event (about 10 hours in total), focusing on segments in which specifically doing “seeing” contrastively informed action constructions.¹ I transcribed these

segments using Jefferson's (2004) system. We obtained informed consent from all research participants (and their guardians if they were under the age of 18). We anonymized all proper names, including the names of local communities and organizations, in the transcription process. I employed conversation analysis as the method of analyzing the data (Sacks, 1992; Schegloff, 2007).

Notes on the demonstration procedure are in order here. I demonstrate the relevance (to the participants) of the distinction between perception and knowledge by explicating the participants' specific or marked ways of connecting their action constructions to the perceived world in front of them. The participants may construct their actions through specifically doing "seeing an object in front of them," without solely relying on or conveying information that they have obtained from the past experience. I show that the distinctive ways of perceiving are constituent components of the organization of their actions. After noting the importance for "the professional analyst's undertaking to establish the understanding of some utterance" to be grounded "in the recipient's displayed understanding, if possible," Schegloff (1996) has argued that the professional analyst's undertaking must also make reference to "the methods or practices that inform the production of the talk being 'analyzed'" (173). In this study, I will first (in Section 3) demonstrate that the practices of doing "perceiving" serve as these methods or practices and ground the demonstration in a detailed analysis of a pair of examples.

Then (in the subsequent sections), I will analyze those segments in which an action construction incorporating doing "seeing" as its component is contrastive with another action construction that is informed by already-obtained knowledge. If one participant resists the latter action construction by specifically

doing “seeing” or, alternatively, the former by disattending to its doing-“seeing” component, the distinction between the two distinct epistemic resources, namely seeing and knowing, can be construed as a practical issue for the participants in the interaction.

3. Doing “seeing” as a constituent part of action construction

Action constructions vary according to whether they are specifically based on (visual) perception and thus designedly connected to the world that is currently perceived and experienced. In this section, I illustrate this variation by examining a pair of examples in which the same action is constructed differently according to whether the construction is based on seeing or verbal information. The speakers construct their actions by specifically doing “seeing an object” or doing “receiving verbal information,” respectively. The difference between the action constructions is embodied in the detail of each construction. In the analysis of these segments, I will show that the issue to be empirically addressed is not how they as individuals actually obtain the necessary information and process it but how they construct an action publicly ascribable to a produced utterance, or in other words, how they incorporate the current perception or the obtained knowledge into the construction of the action in a public way. Both excerpts provide a “natural” control over the condition upon which action construction is differentially accomplished according to whether it is based on perception or knowledge.

These excerpts are taken from interactions during an excursion to a local river with children. On this occasion, the children captured the fish that had been

released into the river and were to roast and eat them. In each of the examples (Excerpts 1 and 2), a child (CH) approaches an adult participant to have a fish skewered, and the adult (Funada [FD] or Abe [AB]) instructs the child to have it gutted before skewering it: “First have the stomach ripped open there and come back again, please” (lines 04 of Excerpt 1) and “Go and have ((guts)) removed” (line 04 of Excerpt 2). The target action is a ground provision for the ensuing instructions: “Not yet?” (line 03 of Excerpt 1) and “Guts have not been removed yet, right?” (line 03 of Excerpt 2). The construction of the ground provision varies according to whether the adult was verbally informed before the turn in question. Excerpt 1 begins as an adult (Funada) asks the child whether the fish was gutted (line 01). (See appendix for transcription conventions.)

```
(1) (River 1)
01 FD:  aa: sore hara      |saita?
        ah  that stomach |open.PAST
        Did ((you have its)) stomach ripped open?
        fd:                |touches the fish
        fd:                |looks at the fish's stomach

02 CH:  mada (des')
        Not yet.

03 FD:  |mada:?
        |not.yet
        |Not yet?
        fd: |starts to turn

04      s-|kocchi    de hara    saite |(moo ichido kite)
        |this.side PRT stomach open | again    come
        First have the stomach ripped open there
        and come back again,
        fd:  |points at the person who is gutting fish
        ch:                |moves forward to
                           the person doing
                           the gutting

05 FD:  kudasa::i.
        please
```

In line 02, the child answers Funada’s question negatively. At the beginning of line 03, Funada acknowledges the child’s answer (*mada?* “not yet?”), and uses his

acknowledgment as the ground for the ensuing instruction. By repeating the answer (with a rising intonation), Funada's ground provision for the instruction (*mada?* "not yet?" line 03) takes the form of the receipt of the information provided by the answer. Furthermore, although Funada is doing "inspecting the fish" (touching and looking at the fish) while he is asking the question in line 01, immediately after he receives the answer, he turns away from the child to point to the person who is gutting fish (line 03). Thus, Funada constructs his ground provision by shifting away from the relevant visual field and thereby doing "receiving the information via the child's answer."

In Excerpt 2, Abe asks the child the same question as Funada did in Excerpt 1: "Did ((you have its)) guts removed?" (line 01). Note that, in this context, having a fish's stomach ripped is understandable as meaning having its guts removed, which is a preparatory procedure for skewering.

(2) (River 1)
 01 AB: sore: wa |harawata nuki totta?
 that PRT | guts remove.PAST
 Did ((you have its)) guts removed?
 ab: -->> looking at the fish ---->>
 ab: |points at the
 fish ----->>

02 | (0.6)
 ch: |looks up at AB and looks down again

fig. 1

↓

03 AB: |harawata |mada totte nai |yone.
 | guts |yet remove not | PRT
 |**Guts have not been removed yet, right?**
 ab: |points to the area where someone is gutting fish
 ab: |points at the fish again
 ab: |looks and points in the
 direction of the gutting area

04 totte moratte kite?
 remove have go
 Go and have ((them)) removed.



Figure 1

However, in this example, Abe does not receive any answer to this question, and a silence ensues instead (line 02). Then (line 03), Abe constructs his ground provision for the ensuing instruction as based on what he currently sees; while providing the ground, he maintains his gaze and pointing gesture toward the stomach of the fish, therefore doing “seeing it currently” (Figure 1). His doing “seeing” is performed such that it is visible to the child; in other words, he shows the child what constitutes the ground of the ensuing instruction, namely, the condition of the fish’s stomach. The difference in formulation of the initial

question between the two excerpts may be worth noting: the formulation “have the stomach ripped” relates to the fish’s appearance while the formulation “have guts removed” refers to the fish’s internal (less visible) condition. Therefore, Abe may also be explicating the meaning of his question by connecting the formulation “guts . . . removed” to the fish’s visible condition after the child failed to answer the question. What Abe is doing with his gaze and pointing gesture in line 03 is thus drawing the child’s attention to the common perceptual field, rather than inspecting the fish to extract necessary information.

Thus, the construction of one action (i.e., the action of providing the ground for the same instruction) varies according to the sequential environment in which the instruction occurs, that is, according to whether the preceding exchanges provide adequate information on which the instruction can rely. In both examples, the sequence is initiated by the adult’s seeking of information. However, when adequate information is not verbally provided, Abe resorts to a different resource for constructing the ground provision; namely, he does “seeing the object for himself” (line 3 of Excerpt 2). Here, perception and knowledge are functionally equivalent alternative resources that participants can differentially use depending on interactional contingencies. What matters here is not perception and knowledge as cognitive processes. In fact, it is most likely that both adult participants (Funada and Abe) gain the necessary information (i.e., that the guts had not been removed) at the moment of line 01 of each excerpt by inspecting the fish. Rather, perception and knowledge are constituent parts of different action constructions, which are accomplished in the details of the participants’ (discursive and embodied) practices. In this study, the distinction between “perception-based” and “knowledge-based” refers to publicly distinct manners of

action construction.

4. Disagreeing on action constructions

In this and the next sections, I go on to demonstrate that this distinction is a practical issue that participants confront in differentially implementing an action (this section) and in one participant resisting the ascribability of a type of action proposed by another (next section). The next example (Excerpt 3) is excerpted from a preliminary inspection of the mountain trails for a hike that the same group planned to organize for the children. Two forestry experts and members of the group, Jingo and Sango, walk side by side along a candidate route for the hike. Sango (SN) is a senior to Jingo (JN). Sango, at the age of approximately 70, has been working for decades on the local mountains, while Jingo, who is also a forestry professional, began to work on the local mountains after the disaster in 2011. In this example, they are continuously walking, so what they see varies according to the progression of their walk.

In Excerpt 3, Jingo and Sango are in agreement regarding their concern about the possibility of children falling down on the mountain trails. However, they differentially construct the action of concern raising; the difference between these ways may be consequential to what they will do before the hike with the children. Jingo even appears to resist Sango's way of concern raising by constructing his action as specifically perception-based. Sango produces the utterance in line 01 of Excerpt 3 immediately after they turn along a gentle curve; the downward straight slope has become visible in front of them. Sango's utterance in line 01 is hearable as occasioned by what he sees (and expects Jingo

to also see) after they make the turn.

(3) (Mountain Trails 0)
01 SN: *a::ngai mada aru ne shita made .hh heh heh hehhh .hhh hh*
It will take more than expected before getting down.
.hh heh heh hehhh .hhh hh
02 (0.8)
03 JN: *'ya::- NHHNg ((clear throat))*
Right/No NHHNg
04 (2.2)
05 SN: *n::nhhh*
Yeahhh,
06 (1.0)
07 JN: *.hhhhh hh .hh maa <kodomo::h> .h|h <kooyuu no demo*
well children | like.this PRT also
.hhhhh hh .hh Well <children>, .h|h <even over things
like this |
jN: |points at a lump of gra
on the ground -->>
08 *korobimasu yo|ne:::>*
fall down, right.>
jn: ----->|
09 SN: *ko(h)robu: .hhh heh heh |heh .hehh hh |.h h*
((They)) fa(h)ll down. .hhh heh heh heh .hehh hh .h h
jn: |has passed the| |
lump of grass | |
sn: |looks at jn ->|
10 (2.2)
11 SN: *nande are kodomo tte kantanni korobun' kana?*
Why uh do children tend to fall down easily?
12 *.hh heh heh hehh .hh ho(h)ntoni(h) .h*
.hh heh heh hehh .hh A(h)ctually(h).
13 JN: *.hh┐h*
14 SN: *┐ha(h)|shinnakere(h)b(h)y(hh)mo(h)no o(h) .h*
Eve(h)n when they do(h) not ha(h)ve to(h) ru(h)n,
sn: |looks at jn ----->>
15 *hashi(h)tte koronden|da. .hh hh .h ┐hh*
they ru(h)n and fall down hh hh .h hh
16 JN: | |┐zettai u-u- ato
| |definitely and
sn: ----->|
17 *|kore o:: .h|h hashitte oriru:--: kodomo mo*
|this PRT | run.and go.down child also
jn: |points at |
the slope ->|
18 *zettai imasu yo┐ne::┐:*
definitely exist PRT
Definitely, uh- And some children went down this
by running, definitely, right. [Lines 16-18]

Combined with the fact that they have been walking for one and a half hours, Sango's utterance in line 01 potentially constitutes a complaint regarding the prospective trouble for the child participants. In response, Jingo produces the token *iya* ('ya:;) (line 03), which has a trouble-indicative connotation, and from line 07 onward, he proceeds to raise another possible concern regarding the children walking down the mountain trail: the possibility of their falling down. In line 09, Sango aligns with Jingo's line of talk by agreeing that the children may fall down, but they talk about the same concern in different manners.

Jingo's utterance (lines 07–08) related to this particular concern is constructed as specifically *based on what he sees on the ground*. Jingo points to a lump of grass on the ground while uttering a deictic expression *kooyuu no* ("things like this" line 07). Therefore, the entire utterance is being observably constructed as based on what he currently sees in front of him. In this sense, Jingo's talk is framed within the reference to the environment invoked by Sango's utterance in line 01. Furthermore, in lines 07–08, Jingo adjusts the progression of his utterance to the progression of his walking. By (1) elongating the inbreath (with an outbreath inserted) at the beginning of line 07, (2) placing the token *maa* (translated as "well") at the beginning of the utterance, and (3) markedly slowing down the first chunk of the utterance, he appears to make the deictic expression *kooyuu no* synchronize with the pointing gesture. One can only successfully point to an object for another when both parties approach it closely enough that seeing it becomes mutually accessible. Jingo thus constructs his raising of a possible concern about the children's falling down by connecting it to the current perceptual field in front of them.

Sango agrees with Jingo in line 09, and following his agreement, he laughs; while he is laughing, he looks at Jingo. He thus appears to invite Jingo to align himself with Sango's own laughter (see Jefferson, 1979, for "inviting laughter," and Stivers & Rossano, 2010, for "mobilizing responses" via gazing). However, when a 2.2-second-long silence ensues (line 10) and Jingo's lack of any affiliative response may be noticeable, Sango pursues Jingo's response by explicitly asking a question about children's tendencies to fall down easily (lines 11–12), presupposing the existence of these tendencies by inquiring about the reason. Following the first possible completion of his turn in lines 11–12 (at the end of line 11), Sango laughs and adds an increment (*hontoni* "actually" in line 12) to the possibly complete turn in line 11. During this period, the absence of Jingo's response to the question becomes observable. Then, in lines 14–15, Sango proceeds to provide a "candidate answer" (Pomerantz, 1988) to his own question ("even when they do not have to run, they run and fall down") to further pursue a response. Thus, a feature of "dispreferred" (disagreeing) responses (i.e., the absence of responses) is observable (Pomerantz, 1984). Here, the incongruence at the level of how an action is constructed may be surfacing.

During the utterance, Sango looks at Jingo rather than at a specific thing or place in the environment, and he also incorporates laugh tokens into his utterance. Sango does not make any pointing gesture to the environment nor use any deictic terms, thereby maintaining the disconnection of his utterance from the world currently extended in front of him. In this fashion, Sango's concern raising about children's tendencies to fall down easily is constructed based on his (claimed) knowledge. The knowledge (that children tend to fall down easily) is assumed to be common knowledge shared by Jingo without Sango having to

provide any evidence or source of it. His concern is also presented as laughable once again; it is marked as non-serious (or “trouble-resistant” [Jefferson, 1984]), funny, and amusing.

Despite the feature of disagreeing responses appearing throughout the exchanges, Jingo does agree with Sango’s candidate answer in lines 16–18 by providing an additional point (*ato* “and” or “in addition”) of the same concern in an emphatic way (*zettai* “definitely”) (although in lines 16–18, Jingo once again does not display any affiliation with Sango’s stance as embodied by the laugh tokens). Both of them agree in that they are concerned about the possibility of children falling down, and more specifically, that some children may run down steep slopes and fall down (and get injured). However, their concern-raising actions are differently constructed. Jingo’s agreement is once again constructed as *based on his current visual perception* by using the deictic term *kore* (“this”) with a pointing gesture; with the deictic term, Jingo hearably refers to the steeper slope onto which they have just stepped.

The features of dispreferred responses displayed in Jingo’s utterances may indicate Jingo’s resistance to the adoption of Sango’s *ways* of talking, that is, talking as if he were enjoying jokingly talking about children’s potential troublesome behavior. As an alternative, Jingo *spots specific things and locations that pose potential troubles on the trails*. In other words, Sango and Jingo raise the same concern in general and specific terms, respectively.

Sango’s and Jingo’s different implementations of the same concern raising may embody alternative ways of participating in one distinct activity: inspecting the mountain trails for a future hike for children. Jingo is the chair of the group that organizes the hike, and he is ultimately responsible for what will happen in

the event. While Sango, as a senior forestry expert, is guiding Jingo through the trails, Jingo is more responsible for decision making. Sango is expected to provide Jingo with rather general comments about the mountains, which are not specific to the planned event but instead based on experiences and knowledge about the mountains in general. Sango's comments about the potential concern for children's behavior on mountain trails may be part of such general comments, although they may not have anything to do with his forestry expertise. In this context, it is a practical issue for Jingo to observably construct his concern raising as connected to the relevant objects on the trails in a sharply contrastive way to Sango's construction; Jingo addresses the issue by specifically doing "seeing them" with deictic terms and pointing gestures.

5. Conflict between knowledge and perception

In this section, I will examine another example (Excerpt 4) that is extracted from the same scene as Excerpts 1 and 2. The same two adults (Abe and Funada) skewer fish for the children. This example features a conflict regarding what type of action should be ascribed to particular utterances. If Abe's utterances are treated as specifically perception-based, that is, as based on what Abe perceives Funada currently doing, the action of suggesting in the sense of an attempt to redirect Funada's current action to the recommended way of skewering is ascribable to them, but Funada appears to resist this treatment. The issue for Abe is how to draw Funada's attention to the fact that his action is specifically connected to the perceptual field. Here, once again, the issue of specifically doing "seeing" an object, as differentiated from having knowledge or information about

it, surfaces as the participants' practical issue.





Figure 2 *Two ways of skewering fish*

Funada is regarded as the most knowledgeable about bonfires (because of his occupation), and accordingly, he is called “Chief.” In the example, as occasioned by Funada’s observable trouble with skewering a fish, Abe first suggests the easiness of skewering the fish through its insides (i.e., he recommends the approach on the right of Figure 2) due to the difficulty in piercing the fish’s skin (i.e., he opposes the approach on the left of Figure 2, which Funada is now attempting). Because of its length, I will present this example by dividing it into two excerpts (4.1 and 4.2).



Within Excerpt 4, Abe offers three suggestions for how to skewer fish by using the same format: “It would be quicker if you did X” (lines 01–02, 07–09 [Excerpt 4.1], and 17 [Excerpt 4.2]). The grammatical construction of these utterances, a comparative conditional one (*shita hoo ga A* [adjective], “it would be more A if you did”), is generally usable for suggestions. The if-clause (i.e., the clause up to *hoo ga*) indicates what is contradictory (skewering through the inside) to what Funada is currently attempting to do (piercing the fish’s skin). Therefore, these utterances are hearable as attempts to redirect Funada’s current action *if* (and only if) they are *hearably* connected to the common perceptual field in which Funada’s current action is perceptually (visually and tactilely) accessible to Abe and Funada. In other words, the intelligibility of these utterances as suggesting the redirection of Funada’s current action relies not merely on the fact that they *are* based on what they currently perceive, but rather on the *construction* of the utterances as based on what Abe currently perceives; that is, the utterances have to be constructed such that Abe’s current seeing of Funada’s current way of

skewering is also accessible to Funada. (Of course, not all types of suggestions require this condition. For example, suggesting that the recipient should do something in the future may be done without any reference to the current status of the environment.)

Although Funada appears to agree with Abe's first suggestion (line 03), he continues his current attempt. One should note the manner in which Funada agrees. Funada registers the receipt of information with the expression *a soo desu ka* ("oh, is that so"). In other words, Funada treats Abe's utterance in lines 01–02 as informing a better way of skewering (which may be considered another type of suggestion) rather than suggesting the redirection of the current action, that is, as the action of conveying a piece of knowledge obtained from previous experiences. The ascribability of such informing to Abe's utterance is not specifically based on what he *currently* sees. The information (a better way of skewering) would be adequately conveyed if the speaker (Abe) knows what Funada has been attempting (and Abe's knowledge is accessible to Funada) but without any *specific* reference to what Abe *currently* sees in front of him. Surely, Abe has obtained such knowledge through what he saw in this scene. However, without any reference to the current perceptual field, the suggestion of redirecting the current action could not be ascribed to Abe's utterance.

In fact, immediately after the production of Funada's information receipt, Abe offers another suggestion (line 04) by more clearly doing "grounding his action in what he currently sees." This suggestion regarding the difficulty of piercing the skin is specifically constructed as a reaction to what he *currently* sees, namely, Funada's continuous attempt to pierce the skin. There are two points to be made here. First, Abe is doing "looking intensely at Funada's handling the

fish” and makes a pointing gesture to the fish (Figure 4). In doing so, Abe makes his seeing of Funada’s action perceptually accessible to Funada. Second, although Abe uses a polite form and its variations (*s’s* or *s’su* [=desu]) when he offers suggestions in lines 01–02, 07–09 (Excerpt 4.1), and 17 (Excerpt 4.2), he uses a non-polite form when he offers the suggestion in line 04 (*nai* not followed by a politeness marker), such that the suggestion is hearable as an immediate reaction to what is going on in front of him (i.e., Funada’s action).

In responding to this suggestion, Funada once again agrees (line 05) but also continues his attempt to pierce the skin. He repeats the main part of Abe’s suggestion (*kawa sasan’ nai* “you cannot pierce [the] skin”) but adds the polite assertive *n’ desu* and the particle *yone*; with the polite assertive, he transforms Abe’s perception-based, reactive suggestion into a general assertion (because of this, I did not add *the* before *skin* in the gloss), and with the particle *yone*, he claims equal access to the information conveyed by Abe’s suggestion (Hayano, 2011; Kamio, 1997). Here, again, Funada treats Abe’s suggestion as conveying information with which he can agree.

Then, after acknowledging Funada’s assertion (line 06), in lines 07 and 09, Abe almost repeats the first suggestion (lines 01–02). He also uses a gesture analogous to the one he made in line 01; this gesture demonstrates the recommended way of skewering fish (see Figures 3 and 5). He uses the same format (“It would be quicker if you did X”), while he changes the verb *ireru* (“insert”) to *sasu* (“pierce”), which is originally used in the explicitly perception-based suggestion in line 04, and replaces the proximate deictic term *koo* (“like this”) with the descriptive term *esu ji* () (“() ‘S’ letter”) (see Schegloff, et al., 1977) or, more precisely, replaces a demonstrative *act* with a descriptive *act*.

Abe's modified repetition achieves three things. First, as a recognizable repetition, it indicates that Funada has not yet responded properly to the original suggestion. Second, by uttering the proximal deictic term referring to his own demonstrating gesture, Abe connects his suggestion to the potentially common perceptual field. Abe's demonstrating gesture, with extended hands, is contrastively juxtaposed with Funada's attempt to skewer the fish (Figure 5); because of this juxtaposition, the gesture may be perceivable as part of the field in which Funada is currently manipulating the fish (Nishizaka, 2017). (Note, however, that Abe's gesture is only made in the *periphery* of Funada's visual field. This may be the reason Abe abandons continuing his demonstrating act, as Funada's concentration on his manipulation of the fish prevents him from seeing the demonstration.) Third, by using the descriptive term, the utterance explicates the main point of the original suggestion: one should make the fish into an "S" letter shape to get it skewered. Funada acknowledges this second suggestion by repeating its main point, namely, "an 'S' shape" (line 10), but still continues his attempt.

Now, in line 12, Funada reacts to what he perceives, which is what he feels and sees while attempting to pierce the skin.

(4.2) [River 1]
 12 FD: |aa sasan nee na.
 |Ah I can't pierce it.
 fd: |pulls the skewer from the fish

13 (0.4)
 14 AB: nn/hai
 Yes.

15 FD: r̄naka o: y-
 |The inside, do-

16 AB: Lna-

17 AB: naka o: esu ji de koo mottetta hoo ga hayai s'su:.
 **It would be quicker if you did ((it)) like this
 in an "S" shape.**

18 (0.4)
 19 FD: °ryookai shimashi ta:°
 Certainly, I will.

Note that Funada here uses a rough form (*nee* is a rough form of *nai* “not”), whereas in his other utterances, he uses polite forms (*desu* in lines 03 and 05; *masu* in line 19). Thus, Funada’s utterance in line 12 is constructed as what Goffman (1981) has called “self-talk” (i.e., talk not addressed to anyone but designedly hearable to the other participant) and designedly reactive to what has happened to him. Simultaneously, Funada pulls the skewer from the fish and initiates a reattempt. In other words, he is doing “reacting to what he currently sees and feels.” Abe appears to acknowledge Funada’s exhibited perception and experience (line 14) and proceeds to offer another suggestion in the same format: “It would be quicker if you did X” (line 17). In this fashion, Abe publicly connects his suggestion to what Funada currently sees and feels. In fact, Abe attempts to offer the suggestion immediately following his acknowledgment in line 16 (*na-*), which overlaps with Funada’s utterance in line 15; he recycles the interrupted word *naka* (“inside”) when beginning the third suggestion (line 17), sequentially deleting Funada’s interrupted talk in line 15 (Jefferson, 1980/1981; see also Schegloff, 1987). Thus, Abe’s third suggestion recognizably builds on the perception of Funada’s doing “seeing and feeling” in line 12. In other words, at

the moment when Funada observably begins a reattempt to skewer the fish based on what he currently perceives in line 12, Abe's third suggestion recognizably builds on this observability and is successfully grounded in their current perceptual field. This time, Funada finally accepts Abe's utterance(s) as a suggestion in line 19 (*ryookai shimashita* "certainly, I will").

Thus, the issue of whether action is treated as specifically based on what one currently sees is the participants' issue. On the one hand, Abe's practical issue is how to construct his utterances so that they are treated as specifically grounded in the current perceptual field. On the other hand, Funada's issue is how to treat Abe's utterances without specific reference to such a current perceptual field and as conveying information; Funada may resist treating Abe's utterances as suggesting the redirection of the current action without explicitly taking issue with the "deontic status" proposed by Abe's suggestion (see Stevanovic & Peräkylä, 2012, 2014).

6. Conclusion

I have shown that the difference of whether an action is constructed as specifically based on what one currently sees in front of them is embodied in the details of the participants' practices and may surface as their issue in interaction. In Excerpts 3 and 4, a potential conflict emerges regarding the construction of action as specifically based on perception; in Excerpt 3, one participant resists constructing a concern raising in general terms that are disconnected from the current perceptual field, and in Excerpt 4, one participant resists treating a series of the other's utterances as specifically connected to the current perceptual field.

In these excerpts, whether action constructions are specifically based on what one currently sees in front of them matters as a practical issue that the participants face in interaction.

This demonstration may have some implications for subsequent investigations. First, participants in an activity are differentially positioned depending on their different identities that are relevant to the activity. In Excerpt 3, for example, Sango's and Jingo's different ways of concern raising, based on knowledge and perception, respectively, embody how they differentially participate in the current activity (i.e., the inspection tour). Specifically, these different ways are indicative of whether they participate as a senior forestry expert (Sango) or as the chair of the group responsible for the organization of the planned hike (Jingo). The relationship between different epistemic resources for action constructions and different identities in an ongoing activity may be worth further systematic exploration (see Raymond & Heritage, 2006; Nishizaka, 2021).

Second, differentially positioned participants have different *projects* to be pursued in jointly organizing the same activity, and these projects inform the construction of actions to be performed in the activity. In Excerpt 3 (the trail inspection), Sango and Jingo may differentially handle the potential troubles in the future. That is, Sango would watch the children carefully and keep them from running during the future hike, while Jingo would remove the obstacles that he *saw* on the trail. (In fact, Jingo mowed the grass on the trails prior to the hike.) In this sense, at the time of Example 3, Sango and Jingo had different projects for a future course of action that extended over the current interaction opportunity (see Schegloff, 2007; Levinson, 2013). Such projects may be pursued by one person or distributed among multiple persons; they may also be temporally and spatially

arranged in various fashions in the contingent development of an interaction.

Third, Heritage (2011) has demonstrated that participants orient to the distinction between experience and knowledge at “empathic moments” in interaction (see also Kuroshima & Iwata, 2016). Current perception should further be distinguishable from both knowledge and past experience. Some epistemic domains are incommensurable (Heritage, 2012a: 5), and knowledge and perception may form such domains. All epistemic domains are entangled in complex ways in the temporal unfolding of an ongoing activity. Certainly, what I have addressed in this study is only a small portion of what should be covered under the rubric of the epistemic dimension. However, I believe that by re-specifying a specifically mobilized epistemic resource as a constituent component of the organization of action, this study contributes to the dissolution of this entanglement as empirically grounded.

Notes

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Appendix: Transcript Conventions

In all the excerpts, each line is composed of two or three tiers. There is first a Romanized version of the original Japanese. Below are phrase-by-phrase glosses where necessary. Finally, the third tier presents an approximate English translation. The first tier of the transcript utilizes Jefferson’s (2004) transcription system. In the second-tier glosses, the following abbreviations are used: JD for “judgmental”; NG for “negative”; and PRT for “particle.” Some excerpts include annotations of the embodied conduct of each participant in the extra tiers designated by lower-case abbreviations such as “fd,” “jn,” and “sn.” The starting and ending points of the movements are indicated by the sign “|”. Double arrows (“-->>”) in these tiers indicate the continuation of the described conduct over the line.