April 12, 2004

The 35th Meeting of Mind and Activity


Saturday, April 24, 2004

1:00 pm. - 5:00 pm.
Honkan (Main building)
Room #1555 (on the north wing of the 5th floor)
Meiji Gakuin University, Tokyo

Presentations

  1. Domenic Berducci,
    "Teaching/Learning and the Demonstration of Knowledge: Cleaning a Test Tube"
  2. In this paper I analyze two sequences from one data set, training in spectrographic analysis, and demonstrate how the first sequence is organized and characterize that sequence as a teaching/learning sequence. The second will be demonstrated to be an enactment of the knowledge learned in the first sequence. Finally, I will discuss the relation between teaching and learning, and between the two sequences, teaching/learning and demonstrating knowledge, as related via the Wittgensteinian concept of internal relation.

    I conclude by pointing out that teaching/learning are co-constitutive (no causal relation) and that demonstrating knowledge is an expression of an achievement (learning). The upshot of this type of research is important for educators, and those occupying opposing research traditions, such as cognitive science.


  3. Aug Nishizaka,
    "Imaginary Space: A Phenomenon"
  4. Aug Nishizaka was going to present, but participants decided to use all time for Dom Berducci's at this meeting. Aug will present at a next meeting.

    What I call "imaginary space" is a recurrently observable phenomenon. It refers to that kind of gesture whose meaning is organized through its juxtaposition with talk and the structure of the participants' bodily arrangement. The meaning of the gesture and the very structure that that meaning of the gesture relies on elaborate each other. It is a kind of what Chuck Goodwin calls a "symbiotic gesture" (the kind of gesture whose meaning is accomplished in the conjuncture of the gesture, talk and the structure of the environment"), but a reflexive one, so to speak, in that body movements structure themselves through each other's conjuncture. In these tems, "imaginary space" is similar to what I call a "surrogate body", but the difference lies in the fact that imaginary space depends for its structure and meaning directly on the structure of the arrangement of the speaker's and the hearer's bodies, rather than the structure of the speaker's body. Imaginary space is not a peculiar phenomenon, again. I present a couple of instances for it and raises some questions about it, attempting to see in which direction the phenomenon will lead us.